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Abstract
Grounded on a multi-theoretic approach, the purpose of this study was to investigate 
and examine the role and performance of board of directors in corporate governance 
in Cameroon. The study was motivated by the absence of rigorous corporate 
governance studies aimed at understanding the role of boards in an African context. 
The study adopted an exploratory research design in which data was collected through 
questionnaire survey and analysed quantitative. A qualitative follow up on the 
quantitative findings to provide a robust explanation was conducted.
The findings suggest that, boards in Cameroon perform multiple roles as identified-by 
the various theories of corporate governance. However, board resource or networking 
was highlighted to be the most important role boards in Cameroon are committed to 
perform. This was followed by strategic control, behavioural control, strategic 
participation, output control, and stakeholder task respectively.
Results pointed to the fact that, board roles depending on how it is executed does 
affect performance of firms. Boards that perform various roles have a positive effect 
on firm performance while boards that are majority shareholder oriented have a 
negative effect on the firm’s performance. It also emerged that corporate governance 
is perceived differently within various industries in Cameroon. Findings also suggest 
CG practices in Cameroon are very much nascent.
The study recommends that corporate governance in Cameroon should be made very 
visible by implementing separate corporate governance impetus geared at ensuring 
accountability and transparency in the way firms operate. It also recommends the 
protection of minority shareholders in firms where there exists concentrated 
ownership. Finally the study recommends owners of firms to hire directors who 
understand risk so that; while they control management, they can effectively and 
efficiently contribute towards firm’s strategy and direction to enhance firm 
performance.
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CHAPTERI
AIMS and OBJECTIVES 
1.0 Introduction
This chapter will provide contextual background of Cameroon corporate governance 
(hereafter CG). This will be followed by a presentation of the research problem statement, 
research objectives, and followed by questions guiding the research. The chapter will 
conclude with an explanation of the aims of the study and structure of the thesis.
1.1 Background of Corporate Governance in Cameroon
The study is situated in Cameroon, which is an interesting context for research 
because of its Anglo-French tradition and due to the fact that in recent years; the 
country has introduced institutional and legal framework to support good CG .For 
example the creation of the Douala Stock Exchange (DSX) market in 2001 and the 
enactment of company law ‘OHADA’ (organization for harmonization of business 
law in Africa). The OHADA company law which governs the whole of the CEMAC 
(Central African Economic and Monetary Community i.e. CEMAC by its French 
initials) region encompasses provisions to limit management excesses which may 
arise from separation of ownership and control of companies. Like in the United 
States, OHADA law recognizes that many businesses CEMAC region does not have 
the split between ownership and control that gives rise to governance issues. In the 
OHADA, so long as there are less than three owners of a business, there can be a 
single manager who, whether or not an owner of the business, can possess the right to 
exercise board functions in addition to those to be performed by senior management 
executives (Dickenson, 2007). In scenarios where there exist a clear separation of 
ownership and control, cases under the OHADA are often interpreted consistent 
with standards which are applicable to French company law e.g. managers of 
companies are not to abuse their rights, neither are minority or majority shareholders 
who may be in a quasi-management function, are to abuse their control of an entity.
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According to the OHADA laws, managers of companies are obliged to make known 
or disclose to the shareholders essential issues of conflict of interest, and are expected 
to monitor and control the company. Rather than relying on fiduciary duties, OHADA 
however lean towards enlisting formal structures.
Similar to developed countries corporate codes e.g., the Vienot 1 and 2 reports and the 
Bouton report of France, the combined code in the UK, the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 
USA; Cameroon under the OHADA also values monitoring and control. In a 
nutshell, CG in Cameroon under the OHADA functions like other governance 
codes mentioned above with the exception that; it imposes greater disclosure 
from companies and tends to make use of external structures and rules instead 
of standard- like fiduciary duties.
Though there are guidelines in the OHADA Company law for effective CG in 
Cameroon, the country still suffers from a very poor ranking in CG and integrity. 
According to the World Bank report 2006; GIZ reports (2011) up to 78% of 
companies in Cameroon believe that corruption is a serious issue affecting CG in the 
country. Indeed, the need for effective CG and the fight against corruption has been 
noted as a pre-requisite for effective implementation of the country’s goal for 
Strategic Growth and Employment geared towards transforming Cameroon into an 
emerging economy by 2035.
According to the World Bank country classification 2015, Cameroon is a lower 
middle-income country. This research is therefore timely given that in 2009, 
Cameroon government launched a growth and development programme for the 
country to transform from a lower middle-income economy to an emerging economy 
by 2035. The Cameroon government has articulated intentions to increase 
transparency and effective CG in the various sectors of the economy especially the 
private sector so as to attract more FDI to contribute in boosting economic growth and 
achieve its goal to become an emerging economy by 2035 (Cameroon Vision 2035, 
2009,pp.28). Firms are expected to adhere to and provide quality and effective 
application of accounting standards and ensure the application of principle of 
transparency and publish their accounts (Cameroon Vision 2035 2009, pp.46). This 
research does add to Cameroons growth strategy by looking at how corporate
director’s function, which will thus enhance investor confidence, as a result of, 
improved CG in the management of firms across different sectors of the economy.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study is to investigate and examine the CG profile of Cameroon, 
the role of board of directors in Cameroon perform and its effect on company 
performance and understand how these roles fit into different CG theoretical 
underpinnings. The Study will investigate the role of CG board of directors from a 
functional perspective through executive board of directors. It is by understanding 
what corporate boards in Africa actually do that we can understand and attempt to 
investigate input-output (CG and performance nexus) relationship that previous 
studies have tended to pursue. This study is intended to open the ‘black box’ of boards 
of directors and CG in Africa. Furthermore, literature on board of directors (hereafter 
BODs) has predominantly been considered and investigated from an agency theory 
and resource dependency theory perspective as the main theoretical underpinnings to 
support the control and service role of boards (Stiles and Taylor, 2001, Huse, 2005, 
Huse, 2007, Minichilli et al., 2009) and have been investigated in isolation to each 
other. The theories used by CG scholars in investigating the BOD and organisation 
performance nexus often implicitly assume that the institutional conditions establish 
in western economies are also present in developing economies. Evidently, this is not 
the situation in developing economies and as a result organizational actions can vary 
significantly from those found in western economies (will be discuss further in the 
literature review). In addition to agency theory and resource dependent theories, this 
study will look at BODs role / task from stewardship and stakeholder perspectives. To 
the best of my knowledge, prior research has not investigated the role of corporate BODs 
in Africa and Cameroon in particular. This study thus is aimed at beginning this process 
by trying to ascertain whether BODs perform the same function wherever in the 
world.
1.3 Research Objectives
I. Identify the perceptions of BODs regarding corporate governance process within 
a Cameroon context.
II. Evaluate how CG theoretical underpinnings ‘fit’ into a Cameroon context
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III. Understand ways in which the role performed by BODs influences performance 
of companies in Cameroon.
1.4 Main Research Question
What is the role o f corporate board of directors in Cameroon?
1.4.1 Research Sub-Questions
I. How do directors perceive corporate governance process in Cameroon?
II. How does the role performed by corporate BODs fit within theoretical 
underpinnings in CG?
III. How does the role performed by BODs affect corporate performance?
1.5 Structure of Thesis
This research study will consist of five chapters. Chapter one is the introductory 
chapter touching on the overview of the research together with the aims and 
objectives which will guide the research; Chapter two will present the theoretical and 
empirical literature by looking at the definition of corporate governance, board of 
directors, and various theories of corporate governance and the development of 
hypothesis/ patterns within this theories and why this theories were chosen for the 
research. This chapter will end with a discussion of CG in Africa and performance 
nexus. Chapter three will focus on the methodology employed that will consist of data 
collection method, the rationale behind this methods and details of data collection with 
participants. This will be followed by thematic interview data analysis, ethical 
consideration and limitation of research methodology. Chapter four discusses the 
results and interpretation beginning with quantitative descriptive statistics then factor 
analysis, correlations and regression results. This will be followed by presentation of 
interview data evidence and interpretation. Chapter five will focus on the conclusion 
limitations and recommendation for future research.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction
This literature review is intended to justify the appropriateness of using the four 
theoretical underpinnings in CG in pursuing the research, and how this study will fit 
within existing argument in CG. Section one of this review will discuss the meaning of 
CG and the justification of the theoretical underpinnings adopted. The second part will 
discuss the BOD in CG. The third section will critically review theoretical approaches to 
CG and what they identify as board role and performance with a development of 
hypothesis or patterns within each theory. The fourth section will discuss empirical 
research in CG in Africa and Firm Performance. The various themes examined in this 
review of literature were informed by a mapping of literature from key publications in 
this subject area (see Appendix I: Figure 1- Literature Map).
2.1 Corporate Governance
“What is corporate governance?” has been a question that has evolved over the years 
in academic literature, practise and policymaking. With lessons learnt from the 
financial crisis there is an overwhelming push for higher corporate governance 
standards in corporations around the world. As a result this question has become even 
more important to many stakeholders (Adams et al., 2008). However attempts to 
answer this question have led to scholars defining corporate governance from 
different theoretical perspectives. Such definitions of CG have been tailored to fit the 
various theoretical underpinnings, which have attempted to explain the role of boards 
in CG. Huse (2007) argues that CG can be seen as a struggle between ideologies as 
any attempt to contextualize its meaning will often be biased. Therefore any CG 
definition is often reflective of the values of those using them. Cadbury report 
(1992), define CG as “a system by which organisations are directed and controlled.” 
From an agency theory perspective, CG is both a way to reduce agency costs and 
reduce private benefits and pet projects, leading to more effective and efficient 
investments, boosting growth and performance, and a way to protect investors from 
managerial expropriation, thus easing organisation’s access to external financing and
enhancing valuation (Bruno and Claessens, 2007). Denis and McConnell (2003); 
Aguilera (2005) define CG from both a stakeholder and agency perspective as a set 
of mechanisms by which shareholders and other stakeholders of a company exercise 
control over managers and in so doing, the managers make decisions that increase the 
value of the company, shareholders and meet the expectations of other stakeholders. 
From an agency theory perspective, the emphasis is upon shareholders while from a 
stakeholder perspective the focus is upon a wider range of stakeholders. However 
from a resource dependency point of view, CG focused on the competitive advantage 
a firm can achieve as a result of expertise and skills of BODs, principally the 
resources that non-executive directors bring to an organisation as an alternative of 
emphasizing the monitoring and control of management (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Nicholson et al., 2007).
In CG most of the attention is towards the board of directors as a governance 
mechanism. However there exist other form of CG mechanism that includes the 
market for control, auditors, laws and regulations. According to Monks and Minow 
(2004), board of directors and managerial stock ownership are two aspect of CG that 
is an effective mechanism to reduce agency cost. For the purpose of this research, the 
interest will be on the BODs as a governance mechanism and the agency problem will 
be discussed in detail in subsequent discussions.
2.2 Board of Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism
As the preceding discussion has seen CG as a fight between different theoretical 
foundations, this struggle extends to what a board of director is. From a shareholder 
focus, Kosnik, (1987), argue BOD’s to be a link between the shareholders of an 
organisation and the managers entrusted with carrying out the day-to-day operation of 
the organization. Keenan (2004) supports this view by contending that BODs are 
individuals who are charged with determining a firm’s overall strategy and to support 
and ensure that adequate controls are in place to protect shareholder interest. But other 
scholars have argue it to be a formal representative of organisations’ stock holders 
whose task is to supervise management performance and protect stakeholder’s 
interest..
The differences in definition and context of what BODs is and the role it plays as a 
CG mechanism can be understood and appreciated by a discussion of the various key 
paradigms that constitute the debate and what these paradigms identify as the role/task 
expectation and performance of boards of directors.
Specifically, this study gives attention to the main four CG theories because literature 
on BODs has predominantly been considered and investigated from an agency theory 
and resource dependency theory perspective to support the control and service role of 
boards (Stiles and Taylor, 2001, Huse, 2005, Huse, 2007, Minichilli et al., 2009) and 
have been investigated in isolation to each other (Nicholson et a/., 2007). Only a few 
scholars have attempted to compare agency theory with other approaches -e.g. 
institutional theory (Judge and Zeithaml 1992; Zona and Zatonni, 2007) or combine 
agency theory with other corresponding perspectives -such as stakeholder and 
resource dependence theories (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Due to the mixed findings 
from CG research, scholars have recently put emphasis on the need to gain access to 
process data and to consider varied theoretical angles other than agency theory (Huse, 
2000; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Pye and Pettigrew, 
2005; Zona and Zatonni, 2007; Minichilli et al.,2009).
Therefore the researcher believes agency, stewardship, resource dependency and 
stakeholder theories are relevant in understanding role of BODs in Cameroon because 
of the following reasons;
Firstly, CG in emerging economies , in Africa and Cameroon in particular is still at an 
infancy stage (Young et al., 2008) thus using the four dominant theoretical 
approaches eliminate the assumption that a particular theory is relevant in the 
Cameroon context as no study till date has provided evidence to support this 
assumption.
Secondly, to choose a single theory in isolation of the others reduces the scope of 
what BODs do. Indeed Nicholson et al, (2007) argue that while each CG theory can 
explain a particular case, no single theory elucidates the universal pattern of results. 
My approach is also supported by Daily et al. (2003) who contend that it is important 
to take a multi-theoretic approach to CG, as it enables the researcher to identify and 
comprehend the interconnectedness of structures and mechanisms that potentially 
enhance organisational performance. Therefore by employing different theoretical
perspective this study seeks to understand in-depth the function of board of directors 
in Cameroon. The study objective in the subsequent sections is to draw on the key 
constructs of each theory to develop an estimated pattern of data to compare against 
my fieldwork. Other theories such as institutional theory, social network theory and 
other related theories have been used by scholars to understand how culture, rules, 
norms, routines and knowledge dynamics affect the functioning of groups within 
particular context, however, after a critical review of relevant literature following the 
literature map on page 78, and given the scope of the research and the interest in 
understanding board function, the four theories discussed below were considered 
more suitable to answer the research questions of the study.
2.3 Agency Theory, Role of BODs and Performance
Agency theory is based on the premise that, there is an inherent conflict of interest 
between a firm’s providers of funds and the people who manage these funds (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Huse, 2007). It is concerned with the 
alignment of the interests of the providers of funds and managers of funds (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rwegasira, 2000). The results of such 
conflict of interest have led to a widespread separation of the control and ownership 
functions of firms as far back as the days of Adam Smith (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). 
According to this theory manager’s of firms have better and extensive knowledge and 
expertise of firms than the providers of funds (shareholders), therefore they are in a 
position to perpetuate self-interested action at the expense of funds providers (Chiang, 
2005; Kula, 2005; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Managerial interest can be manifested 
through clear and tangible benefits such as perquisites (flying first class, large offices 
and luxurious cars) and in less identifiable motivations such as the pursuit for growth 
at the expense of profit maximisation (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).
In order to curb this agency problem, the implications to CG is to provide adequate 
control and monitoring mechanism to protect shareholders from management 
misappropriation (Huse, 2007). Therefore the role of the board of directors as a CG 
mechanism is to monitor and control management and in so doing reduce agency cost 
and increase shareholders value. By monitoring and controlling management by 
BODs, agency cost is reduced and firm performance is improved (Minichilli et al., 
2007; Huse and Zatonni, 2008; Minichilli et al, 2009). The paramount role of BODs
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is to protect shareholders’ from management opportunistic behaviour (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). As a result, BODs are task with actively monitoring and controlling 
behaviours and decisions of top management of companies and in so doing protect 
shareholders’ value maximization (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Huse, 2005; Minichilli et 
al., 2009). From this view, BODs control tasks therefore includes; controlling 
organisation performance, monitoring the actions implemented by management and 
assessing the behaviour of CEO’s and other top management team. To be able to 
perform this role, boards are expected to be committed through preparation i.e. 
willingness to participate in board meetings (Minichilli et al, 2009) and involvement 
i.e. devote time and effort during discussions in board meetings and follow up to see 
that board decisions are implemented (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Minichilli et al,
2009). BODs commitments is argued to be crucial for the board to effectively monitor 
and control management. Following from this we expect the following patterns within 
this role of boards.
PI a: BODs commitment is positively associated with board monitoring and 
controlling management strategy, remuneration, behaviour and output and in so 
doing maximise shareholders value.
Furthermore it is also argued that, for boards to be able to perform their functions as 
expert monitors, they should involve in quality debates aimed at considering broader 
range of options and to take final decisions which are effective in maximising 
shareholders wealth (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). It has been argued in CG literature 
that wider range of alternatives through critical debates may spur the need to reconcile 
diverse results from BODs which may in turn stimulate effective board discussion 
leading to high quality decisions making (Minichilli et al., 2009/ Hence we expect 
the following patterns:
Plb: BODs involvement in critical debate is positively associated with board 
monitoring and controlling management strategy, remuneration, behaviour and 
output and in so doing maximise shareholders value.
Despite the extensive use of agency theory in studying CG in organisations and its 
contribution in understanding the principal-agent conflict and identification of BODs 
monitoring and control task; this theory has attracted criticisms for being very narrow,
and doesn’t provide any clear and substantial problems (Hirsch and Friedman, 1986; 
Perrow, 1986). It has also been criticised for being unrealistically one sided (Perrow, 
1986, p.235), and doesn’t account for any existing cooperation and trust between agents 
and principals (Perrow, 1986; Fehr and Falk 2002). In order to overcome the limitations 
of agency theory, this study will bring in additional theoretical lenses (discussed below), 
which recognise other functions of BODs to provide a holistic understanding of the role 
BODs play.
2.4 Stewardship Theory, Role of BODs and Performance
In contrast to agency theory which sees managers of firms as opportunistic people 
likely to maximise self-interest at the expense of shareholders value creation, 
stewardship theory postulates that managers are trustworthy individuals and so are 
good stewards of the funds entrusted to them by the shareholders (Donaldson, 1990., 
Davis et al., 1997., Daily et al. 2003). This is not to say that stewardship theorists 
accept the opinion of inside/executive directors as altruistic; instead, they recognize 
that there are many situations in which managers of firms conclude that in serving 
shareholders' interests, it serves their own interests.
Therefore to protect their reputations as expert decision makers, managers are 
motivated to manage the firm in a manner that maximizes company performance 
indicators, including shareholder returns, (Daily et al. 2003). According to Davis et 
al., (1997), stewardship theory seeks to explain a model man who is a steward and 
whose behaviour is well ordered such that pro-firm, collectivistic actions generate a 
higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviours. As a result, given a choice 
between self-serving actions and pro-firm actions, managers as stewards will not 
depart from the organization’s interests. Because managers/executive directors spend 
their working life in the day to day running of the business and understand the 
organisation better than outside directors, they can make superior decisions that will 
help enhance company performance and increase shareholders value (Donaldson, 
1990; Huse, 2007).
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory suggests that the role of BODs is to 
collaborate and support management in decision making. This theory asserts that, 
insider-dominated boards contribute a depth of expertise, knowledge, and 
commitment to the firm, which facilitates the process of decision-making (Hendry and
Kiel, 2004). Consequently the participation of outside directors is viewed essential 
only to augment the effectiveness of management activities since inside directors have 
full knowledge of the company’s operations. In regards to this advice given and 
counselling role, BODs task is to actively assess and choose between strategic 
alternatives developed by top managers of the organisation and provide ideas to 
enhance the quality of strategic decision-making. In this view, BODs are a team of 
competent people who help top management of companies to improve their decision­
making process. In view of board service task, BODs commitment will mean the 
willingness of BODs to contribute, participate, support and advise management at 
each stage of the strategic decision- making process of a firm (Westphal, 1999). 
Therefore we would expect to discover the following patterns within board role;
P2a: BODs commitment is positively related to providing advice, support and 
counsel on strategic decision making to top management team to augment the 
quality o f organisational decisions.
In contrast to agency theory which argues for critical debate for the sole interest of 
maximising shareholders return, within stewardship theory, Minichilli et al, (2009) 
opine that critical debate is useful with respect to the BOD ability to perform advisory 
and support functions to management to improve the performance of board’s strategic 
decision making. Hence critical debate can augment strategic decision-making as it 
accelerates the exchange of information within and between the board and 
management. Therefore we would expect to observe the following patterns within 
board role;
P2b: BODs critical debate is positively related to providing advice, support and 
counsel on strategic decision making to top management team to augment the 
quality o f the firm decisions.
Though stewardship theory provides an explanation of the existence of cooperation 
and trust between agents and principals with a two sided view of the principal agent 
relationship (which is a critic of agency theory), it has been criticised for painting an 
excessively rosy picture of managers as stewards (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003) and 
doesn’t address what causes interest of the agent and principal to be aligned (Davis et
al, 1997). Furthermore, stewardship theory argues for the advice and counsel task of 
BODs (Donaldson, 1990. Davis et al, 1997; Daily et a l 2003) but does not address 
the competencies needed by BODs in order to perform this role. Therefore there is a 
need for other theoretical perspectives to understand how BODs provide services to 
organisations through their links to the external environment, resources and 
competencies.
2.5 Resource Dependency Theory (RDT), Role of BODs and 
Performance
Whereas both agency and stewardship theory suggest the role of board from a 
principal-agent perspective, RDT maintains that, the board is a vital link between the 
firm and the crucial resources that the firm needs in order to maximise performance 
(Pfeffer, 1973; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Huse, 2007; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). It 
is argued that the BODs have to be a potentially essential resource for organisations 
especially in its relations with the external environment (Hillman et a l, 2000).
This theory contends that board members are input; as boundary spanners of the firm 
and its environment (Daily et a l 2003). RDT detects the link between the BODs as a 
provider of resources (e.g. advice and counsel, legitimacy, links to other organisations 
etc.) and the firm’s performance. Following from this, the role of the BODs is to 
provide resources to the organisation that can be made use of to become competitive 
in the market place. Consequently BODs performance can be measured by the amount 
and type of resources the board members bring to the organisation. From this premise, 
the composition BODs should be reflective of the resource needs of the firm, which 
may encompass financial, legal, knowledge and environmental resource.
Following from this view, the main task of BODs is to guarantee the firm a steady 
flow of critical and essential resources. In other words, BODs are well-known and 
powerful individuals that make use of their personal networks in order to provide the 
legitimacy, reputation and stock of resources controlled by the firm (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Minichilli et a l, 2009). Within resource dependency 
theory, board committed does mean the BODs are resourceful individuals who are 
committed to provide and link the company to essential resources needed by the firm. 
In view of this theory, the following pattern is expected;
P3a: BODs commitment is positively related to providing critical links and 
essential external resources to management, which helps in enhancing the 
company’s competitiveness and improves performance o f the company.
Within resource dependency theory, board critical debate means board members 
disagreement due to different technical perspectives, which brings out different 
opportunities through critical debate produced during board meetings, which enhance 
the quality of decisions they make (Minichilli et al., 2009). It is argued that complex 
organisational decisions are best solved by boards endowed with a variety of 
knowledge, technicality, skills, abilities and opinions (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). In 
view of this theory, the following pattern is expected to be observed within this theory 
that;
P3b: BODs critical debate is positively associated with providing critical links and 
essential external resources to management, which helps in enhancing the 
company’s competitiveness and improve performance o f the company.
Despite the popularity of resource dependency theory in identifying the need for 
BODs resource role, one of its major critics is that it assumes that organizational 
structure and behaviour are shaped primarily by materialistic forces; and thus fails to 
identify rival influences such as shareholders, stakeholders, cultural, institutional and 
ideological factors (Johnson, 1995). The various forces that affect organisation 
behaviour will be captured by agency and stewardship theory; however stakeholder 
forces will be discussed by the last theoretical approach below.
2.6 Stakeholder Theory, Role of BODs and Performance
In contrast to other theories discussed above, stakeholder theory has a more pluralistic 
view of the role of BODs in CG. The theory seeks to balance the expectation of not 
just shareholders or manager of business but managing the expectations of 
stakeholders’ (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984; Freeman and Gilbert, 1987; 
Freeman and Evans 1990; Tashman and Raelin, 2013). Indeed Philip et a l, (2003) 
contend that attention is to the well-being and interests of those who can hinder or 
assist in the realization of the organizational objectives. Philip et al, (2003) add that;
in this theory, consideration towards interests and well-being of some non-equity 
shareholders is obligatory for more than just the instrumental and prudential purposes 
of value maximization of shareholders. Thus, in contrast to agency theory, this theory 
advocates for the need to meet the expectation of parties who affect and are affected 
by the organisations operations e.g. shareholders, customers, the general public, 
investors, and employees. Following from Kaufman and Englander, (2011) argument, 
the economic purpose of organisations is to provide legitimacy to key stakeholders, to 
those who add value to the firm, can incur harm, face and accept unique risk as a 
result of the firms operation. BODs are therefore charged with the role of satisfying 
expectations of all the parties having stakes in an organisation (Huse 2007). BODs 
therefore have the legal authority to differentiate among these stakeholder groups and 
to allocate rights and responsibilities among them accordingly (Phillips et al., 2003; 
Kaufman and Englander, 2011). BODs can perform their role through negotiation and 
compromise. In other words, BODS task is to serve as the principal who manages and 
coordinates the interest of an entities stakeholder to create new wealth and sustain 
competitive advantage (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984; Kaufman and 
Englander, 2011).
Whereas the afore mentioned theories see board commitment in regards to monitoring 
management, mentoring management and providing networks, stakeholder theory see 
board commitment as the willingness of the board to participate in board meetings 
and devote time and effort during discussions to maximise the interest of stakeholders 
(Philip et al.,2003). BODs commitment is crucial for the board to effectively manage 
the interest of multiple stakeholders. In view of this theory, the following pattern is 
expected;
P4a: BODs commitment is positively related to managing, coordinating and 
protecting the interest o f stakeholders o f a firm to create new wealth and sustain 
competitive advantage.
Furthermore critical debate can enhance critical and investigative interactions to arise, 
which in turn may increase the level of board engagement in making optimal 
decisions for the good of stakeholders. In addition, critical debate may scrutinise
issues that affect interest of the stakeholders. In view of this argument, the following 
pattern is expected:
P4b: BODs involvement in critical debates is positively related to managing, 
coordinating and protecting the interest o f stakeholders o f  a firm to create new 
wealth and sustain competitive advantage.
Despite the recognition of multiple stakeholders by this theory, it has been criticised 
for breeding ambiguity about who actually can be referred to as a stakeholder of a 
firm (Philip et al, 2003). Critics of this theory have argued it to be immoral since it 
does not recognise agency relationship and therefore provides unscrupulous 
executives of companies with a ready justification to their opportunistic behaviour 
thus reviving the agency problem which agency theory was designed to overcome 
(Jensen, 2000; 2010; Sternberg 2000).
The limitation of the various theories discussed therefore goes further to support my 
approach of using multi-theoretic approach in understanding the role of BODs in CG 
in a developing economy. Based on these theories, researchers have quantitatively 
investigated the composition and structure of BODs in developed countries and this 
has started gaining momentum in emerging African economies. In the following 
section, I shall discuss some of the studies in Africa and identify a gap in CG 
research.
The choice of board commitments and critical debate as a predictor to understand to 
board task performance across the four theories discussed is drawn from the argument 
that; to understand what boards do, measuring their commitment through attendance 
of board meetings, preparation for board meetings and decision making decision 
during board meetings as well as follow up of these decisions after meetings is more 
suitable in predicting the behavioural aspect of boards (Huse, 2007; Minichilli et 
a l,2009). In addition critical debate during board meetings reveals the type of 
strategies and or focus of boards in directing a company to a particular direction. 
Indeed, Forbes and Milliken (1999) noted that quality of debates in board meetings 
helps in understanding board roles. This approach was adopted by Minichilli et 
al, (2009) and their empirical results showed commitment and critical debate
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amongst directors as better predictors of board task than demographic characteristics 
of board members. Hence given the interest of this study to understand board task, 
critical debate and commitment were the natural choices to use to across all the four 
theories to answer the research questions.
2.7 Corporate Governance in Africa, BODs and Firm Performance
The impact of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990’s saw a new and heated 
debated on and about CG in developing capital markets. The crisis exposed both 
widespread absences in CG and the monitoring role of BODs with the inability of 
regulatory watchdogs to control and oversee financial institutions in the region 
(Rwegasira, 2000). With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, African countries 
also witnessed the same trend of liberal thought and the promptness of an immense 
denationalisation and privatisation of what used to be called ‘public enterprises’. With 
the trend in globalisation, CG has become crucial apparently not due to what Africa is 
today but because of what Africa is developing into. The integration of global capital 
markets offers opportunities to developing countries in Africa and an avenue to 
increase and attract foreign direct investments (FDI), modernise technology, private 
investment, productivity, employment and rapid economic growth. To be able to 
achieve these goals, it is imperative for firms in Africa to adopt good CG systems 
(Rwegasira, 2000). According to Rwegasira, (2000); Mehdi,(2007)., Africa is the seat 
of developing markets thus the ability of Africa to take part in this imminent growth 
is dependent on how swiftly and efficiently governments can resolve political and 
socio-economic strife, bureaucratic controls, corruption, unsupportive legal 
infrastructure issues with special emphasis to capital markets and CG in particular.
As it has been investigated extensively in developed economies and widely 
recommended that good CG increase firm performance though sometimes with very 
contradictory results (Erhardt et al. 2003; Smith et al, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 
2007; Smith, Smith and Vemer, 2006; Neilsen et al, 2008; Miller and Del Carmen 
Triana, 2009). Scholars who have investigated CG in Africa have tended to follow 
this agenda. Most of the research in this area has tended to look at board composition, 
structure, characteristics, ownership characteristics and board demographic 
characteristics and its effect on firm performance. Such studies include Abor (2005) 
who examined the relationship between CG and capital structure decisions of listed
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Ghanaian firms. His result indicates a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between board size, board composition, CEO duality and capital structure. Mehdi, 
(2007) examined the link between BODs, ownership structure and financial markets 
performance by using a sample of 24 listed Tunisian firms for the period 2000-2005. 
From his results, he provided evidence that there is a strong relationship between CG 
and corporate performance. Abor and Fiador, (2013) also investigated the effect of 
CG on firms dividend pay-out with a sample 27 Ghanaian firms, 177 Nigerian firms, 
270 South African firms, 51 Kenyan firms, from the period 1997-2006. Their results 
showed that, the composition of BOD and board size had significantly positive 
relationship with dividend pay-out in both Kenya and Ghana. While institutional 
ownership also showed a positive influence on dividend pay-out among Kenyan and 
South African firms. But in Nigeria, all the CG measures showed significantly inverse 
effects on dividend pay-out.
Though research in CG in Africa is still at an early stage, rigorous CG studies within 
the African context is still lacking. The studies that have attempted to understand CG 
in Africa have tended to follow the agenda of the current research studies in 
developed markets. This thus perpetuates the assumption that corporate boards in 
Africa have similar attributes with corporate boards in developed economies. In 
following the agenda of CG research in developed economies by studying board 
characteristics, structure, composition and its effect on performance, it is assumed that 
BODs in Africa behave and perform there in same manner as corporate boards in 
developed economies. The theories used by CG scholars in investigating the BOD and 
organisation performance nexus often implicitly assume that the institutional 
conditions establish in western economies are also present in developing economies. 
Evidently, this is not the situation in developing economies and as a result the 
organizational actions can vary significantly from those found in western economies. 
Thus the reality of how corporate board in Africa function is still unknown, this is 
where the study seeks to contribute to the on-going debate. This study thus is aimed at 
beginning this process by trying to ascertain whether BODs perform the same 
function wherever in the world.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Introduction
This chapter will discuss and describe the rationale behind the research methodology 
from the research design, choice of methods employed, the data collection techniques 
used. The first section will discuss the suitably of the research design employed. This 
will be followed by a discussion of philosophical position of the research. The third 
section will discuss the methods of data collection. The fourth and the firth sections 
will discuss the ethical considerations and the methodological limitation of the 
research respectively.
3.1 Research Design
This study adopted a research design that was derived from the research questions and 
prepositions generated from the review of literature and also answer to the calls for 
new approaches to the understanding of CG. The research adopted an explanatory 
research design to guide the researcher in identifying the role of BODs in CG. In this 
research design, data was collected and analysed quantitative then a qualitative follow 
up on the findings of the quantitative result was carried out to provide a robust 
understanding of the quantitative results. This design allowed the researcher to select 
cases from quantitative data and detect questions that need further investigations in 
the qualitative phase of the research (Harrison, 2012). This method is supported by 
Creswell et al., (2003); Harrison (2012), who contends that exploratory research 
designs are frequently, conducted when there is a need for qualitative data to help 
explain or build on initial quantitative data.
By adopting a mixed method research design in this study; the study responds to the 
call for a new direction to CG research by employing both a qualitative and 
quantitative approach in studying CG (Huse et al., 2009; McNulty et al., 2013).
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McNulty et al., (2013) argue that, the difference in the different methods of 
qualitative and quantitative research provides scholars with complementary lenses to 
explore CG issues. According to these authors, the use of a variety of methods will 
help CG scholars to gauge into a deeper and richer understanding of the CG 
phenomena under study. Jick,(1979) argue that, researchers in business and 
organisational studies can improve the exactitude of their judgments by gathering 
different kinds of data and employing different methods bearing on the same 
phenomenon. According to Jick, (1979), by employing an explanatory research design, it 
allows the researcher to be more confident with his results and present opportunities for 
the creation of inventive methods. By following an explanatory research design, the 
researcher provides new ways of capturing CG issues to balance with conventional 
research design and data collection methods in CG. In addition, the adoption of 
explanatory research design has been motivated by the need for new methodological 
approaches bearing in mind the large number of mixed empirical results in CG research 
which has predominantly been quantitative in nature (Zatonni et al., 2013; Huse et al., 
2009). Therefore by using both questionnaire and semi structured interviews to capture 
the perception of executive board of directors of companies in Cameroon, this study will 
provide a deeper and richer understanding of the role of BODs in Cameroon and allowed 
the researcher to be more involved with the CG issue under study.
3.2 Research Approach and Rational
In social science research, there are predominantly two research philosophies, which 
are positivism and social constructivism. From a positivist perspective according to 
Easterby-Smith et al., (2008), the social world exists externally and as such its 
properties can and should be measured through an objective method rather than being 
subjectively inferred through sensation, intuition and reflection. This is supported by 
Hammersley, (2002) who opine that positivism seeks to apply scientific methods in 
studying and understanding social phenomena’s including the study of human 
behaviour, social constructs and history. On the other hand is social constructivism 
which oppose the positivist stand by arguing that, social science research deals with 
people and people are different from atoms or non -human form of life (which is the 
centre of most natural science research) because they actively interpret or make sense 
of the environment in which they live and as such, the ways in which they interpret 
themselves and their environment is shaped by particular cultures in which they find
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themselves (Hammersley, 2002; Bryman and Teevan, 2005; Easterby-Smith et al,
2008). Consistent with the research design adopted in this study, the study 
encompasses both a positivist and social constructivist paradigm a blend known as 
‘pragmatist paradigm’. According to Creswell (2003), pragmatist paradigm is 
associated with mixed method approach, which entails strategies that consist of 
collecting data in a sequential or simultaneous manner by adopting methods which are 
derived from both quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches in a manner 
that best addresses the research questions of a study. Consistent with this argument 
and to ensure a reliable interpretation of results, this research analysed and interpreted 
the quantitative and qualitative data from a positivist and constructivist perspective 
respectively. By adopting a pragmatist perspective, this study; answers questions 
which mono-methods approach in CG have not yet answered (Bryman, 2004); will 
provide stronger inference through breadth and depth in understanding the role of 
BODs in CG and will provide the opportunity through different findings for an 
expression of different points of view (Creswell 2003).
3.3 Methods of Data Collection
This research uses primary data as the main data component. Primary data was 
collected through a survey questionnaire, semi-structured interviews and filed notes. 
Secondary data from annual reports was collected to supplement the primary data. 
These data collection methods are discussed below.
3.3.1 Primary Data- Questionnaire Survey
The survey aims at revealing the role of BODs in companies in Cameroon. The 
survey targeted all sectors of the economy. The choice of targeting all the sectors in 
the.economy was to increase the chances of having more respondents as limiting it to 
a particular sector(s) would have limited the sample size. The survey was targeted 
towards executive board of directors of companies in Cameroon (see copy of survey 
in appendix IX, pp.89). This study is consistent with CG studies which studies, which 
have incorporated primary data, which are traditionally constructed on a single 
respondent (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Huse, 2000; Minichilli et al., 2009). The natural 
choice of a single respondent is due to the difficulty in accessing primary data on 
board of directors as it has been noted in CG literature that; directors have the 
tendency to conduct business in secret (Pettigrew, 1992; Daily et al., 2003; Minichilli
et al, 2009). Consistent with Minichilli et al, (2009), who use the CEO as the key 
informants to their research, this study used executive directors including CEOs as the 
key informant as they are in a better position than other board members because of 
their supposed knowledgeability to provide information on the issues under study. 
Initially the questionnaire was to be distributed to the respondents through a web 
based survey and a paper copy survey. Before the questionnaire was distributed, the 
researcher first of all tried contacting the respondents through email. In a total of 30 
emails sent to participants to introduce the research and to seek approval to participate 
in the research, only 3 of the executive directors who were contacted via email 
responded to the emails and indicated that they will be willing to take part in the 
study. This therefore made the researcher to decide to drop the web based survey and 
the paper copy survey became the natural choice. The questionnaire was distributed to 
the respondent by the researcher personally.
This process of distributing the questionnaire personally to the respondents was 
chosen because of the poor postal system in the country and the ability of the 
researcher to be able to explain in detail to the respondents and seek their consent in 
participating in the research. It also provided the opportunity for the researcher to 
recruit participants for the interview part of the research. Furthermore, this method of 
questionnaire distribution enabled the researcher to use the ‘snowballing’ technique in 
recruiting additional participants. This method of collecting data through snow ball 
sampling is supported by Esterby-Smith et al.,(2008) who opine that, snow balling 
works well where participants are very rare to find and when it’s difficult to know 
who belongs to the population to be sampled. In this study, this technique was very 
productive as 80% of the respondents after completing the questionnaire became 
comfortable with the research and recommended additional participants from other 
companies who became part of the research.
The researcher used structured interview survey in collecting data as all the executive 
directors who met the researcher accepted to complete the questionnaire. 80% of the 
respondents completed the questionnaire in the presence of the researcher as this 
allowed them to ask further clarity to some questions and probed further discussions. 
This also eliminated the possibility of the participants (CEO, CFO, executive 
directors) asking their PA’s to answer the questionnaire for them (Easterby-Smith et
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al., 2008). For the 20% of the respondents whom the researcher could not meet during 
the questionnaire distribution (who completed the questionnaire in the absence of the 
researcher), the researcher dropped the questionnaires with their PA’s and after 
completing the questionnaire, the respondents called researcher and arranged a pick 
up. This was so because it was indicated in the questionnaire that because of 
confidentiality and anonymity, the questionnaire should be handed only to the 
researcher and the researcher’s number was provided in the questionnaire. The 
researcher used the opportunity during the call to arrange for a 5-10 minutes meeting 
with the respondent. This enabled the researcher to be able to cross check the 
responses to the various questions at the time of collection with the participant and 
bring to the attention of the respondents in cases were the was unanswered questions; 
clarify any doubts and arrange for a possible interview.
Therefore the researcher had control over making sure that the targeted respondent is 
the person completing the questionnaire. Hence completeness and accuracy was 
achieved. This is supported by Easterby Smith et al., (2008), who argue that 
structured interview survey may be the most effective way to collect survey data and 
provides a small, accurate and reliable dataset than a large dataset which is riddled 
with errors. The survey cover letter and the OU consent form (see appendix VIII, 
pp.86) guaranteed anonymity to moderate participant’s propensity to make socially 
desired answers (Minichilli et al, 2009). The survey questions were adopted from 
Minichilli et al., (2009) survey instruments and few more questions were added to 
capture areas which were not covered in their questionnaire e.g. questions related to 
stakeholder interest. The researcher conducted thorough scrutiny of the wordings of 
the questions to avoid vague concepts. The resulting questionnaire was piloted with 
two respondents and ambiguous items where refined. The survey was made available 
to the respondents in both English and French to avoid language bias. Each 
respondent had the choice to choose which language they preferred in completing the 
questionnaire.
Research on BODs using surveys has often yielded low response rate, which is 
usually below 20%. It is argued that this low rate of responses is due to the fact that 
directors are very busy professionals and they are aware that some private information 
cannot be revealed outside their organisations (Pettigrew, 1992; Minichilli et al., 
2009). Of the 50 questionnaires distributed and then collected by the researcher, 31
were retuned and none was eliminated due to missing information corresponding to 
62 per cent of the questionnaires answered.
Data collected was split as follows: agroindustry (4 or 13%), Oil and Gas and Mining 
(4 or 13%), Whole sale and retail (5 or 16%), Manufacturing (2 or 6%), financial 
services (10 or 32%), Public administration (2 or 6%), Business services (3 or 10%), 
Transport, communication and Storage (1 or 3%) (See table I below). This was 
compared against the GDP of the country by sector for 2013 as published by AFDB, 
OECD, and UNDP economic outlook for Cameroon. To validate that the sample is 
representative of the GDP share per sector, and to understand if there were significant 
variation between respondent and the share of GDP per sector, the Kruskal -Wallis 
test (Cooper and Schindler, 2006; Van Den Berghe, 2002; Wruck and Wu, 2009) was 
performed and the results showed a 0.5 level of significant indicating that the 
distribution of the respondents was the same across each category of GDP. The 
comparison showed that the various sectors of the economy are represented in the 
sample. About 65 per cent of the firms in the sample are located in the economically 
developed Douala (littoral region), 10% of the firms are located in the country capital 
Yaounde (Centre region), and 15% and 10% of the firms are located in the South 
West and North West region of the country respectively. A calculation of the total 
contribution of various firms in the research sample gives approximately 5% 
contribution to the country’s GDP.
T a b le  1: S a m p le  R e p r e s e n ta tio n
Sector
Number of 
Respondents % Respondent % GDP
Agro industry 4 12.9% 22.5%
Oil and Gas, Mining 4 12.9% 8.2%
Whole sale and Retail 5 16.1% 19.9%
Manufacturing 2 6.5% 14.5%
Finance 10 32.3% 11.0%
Public Administration 2 6.5% 8.5%
Business Services 3 9.7% 1.0%
Electricity, gas and water 0 0.0% 1.0%
Construction 0 0.0% 6.0%
Transport, storage and communication 1 3.2% 7.2%
Total Respondents 31 100% 100%
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3.3.2 Primary Data- Semi-Structured Interviews and Field Notes
Semi-structured interviews were used to get the most out of the interview and allowed 
tailoring of each interview to the individual respondents (Nicholson et al., 2007). The 
need for qualitative data in CG research to augment ambiguous quantitative findings 
(Huse et al, 2009; Zatonni et al, 2013) motivated the collection of interview data. As 
part of the questionnaire, a question was asked to directors to indicate if they will be 
willing to have a follow up interview with the researcher. Out of the 31 respondents 
who completed the questionnaire, 23 of them (74%) agreed to participate in the follow 
up interview. Due to time constraint and availability of both the researcher and the 
respondents who wanted to be interviewed, the researcher was able to conduct 8 semi 
structured interviews with directors (See interview questions on appendix X, pp.94). 
The criterion used for selecting participants from the sample of 23 was through 
purposive sampling. In this sampling technique, the researcher decided on which 
participants to include in the sample. This was based on their wealth of knowledge 
and experience about the research topic, willingness to contribute to the research and 
representativeness of the sample. Out of the total of 8 interviews, 3 interviewees 
represented the agro industry sector which represents the largest share of the country’s 
GDP (23%), 3 interviewees from financial service sector, one director from the 
transport, storage and communication sector and one from the Oil and Gas and 
Mining sector.
Interviewees were asked to choose a comfortable location for the interview and all of 
them indicated that they are happy to be interviewed in either their offices or a 
conference room. Seven of the interviews took place in the offices of the directors and 
one took place at the conference room of the organisation. The researcher has 
confidence that a sample size of 8 participants is adequate to accomplish the 
objectives of the study. This sample size exceeds Guest et al., (2006) recommendation 
of 6 participants on average, for exploratory studies as is the case with this study. 
Interviewees consisted of seven men and a female interviewee. This is reflective of 
the sample size of the questionnaire, which had 24 men and 7 women. In addition, 
amongst women who answered the questionnaire six indicated that they wanted to be
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interviewed for the research. All the female participants who answered affirmative to 
the interview in the questionnaire were contacted as the researcher intended to 
increase the number of female interviewees in the sample. However when they were 
later contacted by the researcher to schedule an interview five of the women declined 
to be interviewed given reasons to do with time, meetings, travelling and preparation 
for end of month and board meetings.
All participants but one agreed that the interview be audio recorded for easy 
transcription and analysis by the researcher. The respondent who refused to be audio 
recorded gave personal reasons not related to the research as the reason behind the 
refusal. In this case the researcher took notes during the interview. Each interview 
lasted for approximately 40 minutes.
As discussed above, the administering of questionnaire through structured interview 
survey allowed the researcher to probe further discussion and clarity of questions. 
During this process, the researcher had the opportunity to collect field notes from 
participants. In the course of respondents completing questionnaire and before and 
after interviews, interesting discussions on both the content of the questionnaire came 
up and participants in many cases discussed at length about CG and board issues.
3.3.3 Secondary Data - Documentary Evidence
Consistent with research in CG which have used documentary evidence to supplement 
other data collection methods (Nicholson et al., 2007; Minichilli, 2009; Zona and 
Zattoni, 2007), this study collected data from company websites , IMF,AFDB ,OECD 
websites and reports, newspaper articles, trade publications, country statistics, 
company laws (OHADA and 1999 law) , industry statistics , annual reports. This 
documentary evidence assisted the researcher as a rich source of additional evidence 
to the interview conversations with participants (Loraine et al., 2010, p.230), provided 
some quantitative data on CEO duality (discussed later in data analysis), industry 
regulations, CG compliance and other variables. The use of documentary evidence in 
this research conforms to what Loraine et al., (2010, p.231) describe as abstracting 
from each document important elements, which reveal ideas, issues and policies that 
are relevant alongside other data collection methods such as interviews and 
questionnaires.
3.4 Ethical Considerations
Cognisance of the ethical requirements guiding research at the Open University, high 
and strict ethical principles were observed at each stage of the study in order to 
preserve the reliability and integrity of the study and the researcher maintained 
professionalism at every stage of the research. The researcher adhered to all The Open 
University’s Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) ethical guidelines by 
collaborating with supervisors. The researcher applied in good time for an ethics 
approval from HREC and a favourable responds was granted before data collection in 
Cameroon (see appendix VII, pp.85. for ethical approval form and complete 
description of ethical consideration). The researcher has continuously safeguarded the 
rights of the participants by anonymizing their identities and codifying each 
participants responds with the use of pseudonyms in both the questionnaire and 
interview transcription (Bryman and Bell ,2007; Saunders et al., 2007; Fisher, 2004). 
In addition, the researcher has continuously protected the confidentiality of data 
collected to maintain the trust bestowed on him by the participants. To avoid the 
possibility of researcher bias, the researcher has maintained high degree of objectivity 
throughout the study.
3.5 Variables Discussion
The subsequent sections will discuss the dependent variables, independent variables 
and control variables used in the study. A questionnaire survey as discussed above 
was used to collect data for dependent, independent and some control variables. See 
Appendix V: Table 9- Descriptive Statistics for Board Function Items, pp.83 for sources of the 
various questions used in the questionnaire.
3.5.1 Dependent Variables
Dependent variables were built using items on a five-point Likert scale (Minichilli et 
al., 2009; Kula, 2005). The variables used as dependent variables were related to the 
various board tasks identified by the various theories which were discussed in the 
literature review section of the thesis ( Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2009; 
Minichilli et al, 2012). See Appendix II: Table 2 - Factors of Board Task for factor 
loadings for board task variables.
From an agency theory perspective, control task was measured using 9 items which 
were categorised under board behavioural control (4 items), board output control (4 
items) and board strategic control (1 item) (Huse, 2005; Minichilli et a l, 2009; Huse 
1993; Zona and Zattoni,2007; Minichilli et al, 2012). Under behavioural control, 
executive directors were asked to assess the degree to which the board (i) monitor 
management behaviour, (ii) define activities of top management team (TMT), (iii) 
supervising CEO/GM/MD, (iv) is accountable to shareholders (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001). A Component factor analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation (Sabina and Huse; 
2006; Minichilli et al, 2012) showed that all 4 items loaded to one factor with a 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) of 0.626, eigenvalue of 
2.158 and factor loadings greater than 0.6. A test of internal reliability and validity of 
these 4 items gave a Cronbach alpha of 0.71 which is above the accepted benchmark 
of 0.60 in social science research (Brace et a l 2009).
With regards to board output control, directors were asked to rate the degree to which 
the board (i) ensures that management activities are inline organisational goals (ii) 
evaluates and approve of TMT plans, (iii) is kept informed of financial position of the 
organisation and (iv) is sufficient briefed by TMT. A PCA showed that all 4 items 
loaded to one factor with KMO of 0.648, eigenvalue of 1.158 and factor loadings 
greater than 0.5. The Cronbach alpha for this for these items is 0.605. Finally the 
strategic control task (Minichilli et al., 2009) was measured by asking directors to rate 
on a five-point-Likert scale the extent to which the board is actively involved in 
monitoring and evaluating the strategic decisions taken by management.
From a stewardship theory point of view, board services task was categorised into 2 
categories and containing 8 items: board advisory task (5 items) and board strategic 
participation (3 items) (Minichilli and Hansen, 2007; Zattoni and Zona, 2007; 
Minichilli et al., 2009, Minichilli et al., 2012). In the board advisory task category, 
executive directors were asked to rate the degree to which they agreed on a five-point 
Likert scale on the board contributing and providing advice to TMT (i) on 
management issues (e.g. organisational strategy and structure), (ii) on financial issues 
(e.g. long term loans, liquidity and relationship with financial institution), (iii) on 
technical issues (e.g. new technology in the market or competition), (iv) market issues 
(e.g competition, market segmentation, customer trend ), (v) on legal and taxation
issues (e.g. regulatory laws). PCA showed that all 5 items loaded to one factor with 
KMO of 0.770, eigenvalue of 2.649 and factor loadings greater than 0.6. Reliability 
and validity test using the Cronbach alpha for these 5 items was 0.776. Board strategic 
participation was measured by asking the directors to rate the level to which the agree 
on the board is actively involved in (i) promoting strategic initiatives in and out of the 
organisation (ii) long term strategic decision of the organisation and (iii) the 
implementation of long term strategic decisions. PCA results indicate that all 3 items 
loaded on one factor with KMO of 0.724, eigenvalue of 2.508 and factor loadings 
greater than 0.8. Reliability and validity test showed a Cronbach alpha for the three 
board strategic participation items was 0.895.
Board networking task from a resource dependency standpoint was measures using 3 
items (Zattoni and Zona, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2009, Minichilli et al., 2012) by 
asking the executive directors to rate in a five-point Likert scale the degree to which 
they agree on the board providing (i) the firm with linkages to important external 
stakeholders i.e. regulatory authorities, banks, government institutions, policy makers 
, stock market etc (iii) external legitimacy as perceived by those outside the 
organisation and contributing towards sustaining the firm’s reputation (iii) outside 
information for the firms strategic decision making. PCA results show that all 3 
items loaded on one factor with KMO of 0.706, eigenvalue of 2.221 and factor 
loadings greater than 0.7. The test of validity and reliability of the three networking 
items gave a Cronbach alpha of 0.823.
With regards to the board performing the task of satisfying stakeholders other than the 
shareholders from a stakeholder theory view point, executive directors were asked to 
measure using 5 items on a five-point-Likert scale the degree to which the board (i) 
consider the interest of other stakeholders other than the shareholders (e.g. customers, 
employees, regulatory authorities etc.) in its strategic decision making (ii) provide the 
firm with legitimacy (recognition and legality) in its dealing with key stakeholder (iii) 
prioritise among stakeholder groups and allocate rights and responsibilities 
accordingly (iv) ensures satisfaction of the firms stakeholders (v) provide leadership 
by involving different stakeholder groups in the decision making of the firm. PCA 
results show that all 5 items loaded on one factor with KMO of 0.728, eigenvalue of
2.393 and factor loadings greater than 0.5. The test of validity and reliability of the 
five stakeholder task items gave a Cronbach alpha of 0.711.
3.5.2 Independent Variables
Consistent with studies in CG which have looked at the role and performance of 
corporate boards, this study collected data on board member’s commitment and board 
critical debate (Minichilli et al., 2009, Forbes and Milliken, 1999) as independent 
variables for the study.
Board of director’s commitment was measured using 10 items on a five point Likert 
scale. These items include Minichilli et al., (2009) seven items which covers both 
board preparation and involvements concepts (Minichilli et al., 2009; Huse, 2007). 
The additional 3 three items added to capture the frequency to which board members 
attend board meetings and the structure and organisation of board meetings (Zona, 
and Zattoni, 2007).
Board of director’s preparation (Minichilli et al., 2009) was captured by asking 
executive directors to rate the degree to which directors (i) examine the information 
provided by management prior to board meetings, (ii) collect additional information 
to supplement that provided by TMT, (iii) come to board meetings well prepared. 
Director’s involvement was measured by asking directors to rate the level at which 
directors, (iv) devote the necessary time needed to accomplish their task (v) are 
available to fulfil their activities in the board, (vi) attend board meetings, (vii) use 
their knowledge effectively as needed in meetings, (viii) ask useful questions on 
proposals advanced by management, (ix) raise critical points during meetings (x) 
contribute in the structure and organisation of meetings. Cronbach alpha for these 10 
items was 0.892.
Board critical debate was measured on 6 items. These constituted the items used by 
(Minichilli et al., 2009). Directors were ask to rate on a five point Likert scale the 
level at which conflicts and disagreements occur within board of directors on (i) 
decisions to be taken in the course of board meetings, (ii) the interest of different 
stakeholders, (iii) the general purpose of the organisation, (iv) the working style of the 
board, (v) the decision process and (vi) among board members. In this case the 
Cronbach alpha is 0.821.
3.5.3 Control Variables
This study intended to control at both industry level and board level (Minichilli et al.,
2009). The researcher collected information from annual reports, company websites 
and industry reports to capture some board demography variables; however it was 
realised that all the firms in the sample had different individuals occupying the 
position of the CEO and Chairman. Therefore the construction of a dummy for CEO 
Duality (‘1* = separation of CEO and Chairman Position and ‘0’= concentration of 
CEO and chairman on same individual) had a mean of 1 meaning 100% separation of 
power. Hence this variable was dropped.
However at board level the study controlled for board interlock by asking directors if 
they are directors of other boards. It has been argued that interlocks are positively 
correlated with board and firm performance (Nicholson et al, 2003). Interlocks were 
measured by a dummy variable (1-yes) based on director’s indication. It has been 
argued that the finance sector is highly regulated and plays a major role in the 
functioning of economic systems than other sectors in an economy (Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008) hence they are subject to more intense regulation than other sectors 
(Adams and Mehran, 2005). Following from this, the study controlled for industry 
regulation by introducing a dummy variable (1= regulated) for those firms in the 
study from the financial service sectors
3.6 Methods of Quantitative Data Analysis
The study analysed quantitative data with the used of descriptive statistics, factor 
analysis, correlation and regression analysis. The choice and method of analysis 
through this various methods is discussed below.
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics was used to describe the basic structures of the data in the study. 
It will provide simple summaries about the sample and the various measures (Sapford; 
2007; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et a l, 2007). The natural choice of 
descriptive statistics as the starting point of data analyses is due to that fact that, 
descriptive statistics with simple graphics analysis forms the basis of virtually every 
quantitative analysis of data (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). Hence the descriptive 
statistics in this study provides the bedrock for further quantitative analysis.
3.6.2 Factor Analysis
In CG research, scholars have often grouped some of the dependent variables under 
two roles: service and control role (Minichilli et al., 2009).The service task is based 
on resource dependency and stewardship theories and the control task is based on 
agency and stakeholder theories (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2005; Huse, 
2007). Thus due to the possibility of conceptual overlap of the variables, an attempt 
was made to identify a parsimonious combination of variables fundamental to the 
primary dimensions underlying the set of 25 questions on board role (Kula, 2005; 
Podsakoff et al. 2003; Minichilli et al., 2012).
3.6.3 Correlation Analysis
As with descriptive statistics, bivariate correlation analysis was conducted to describe 
the degree of relationship between the dependent, independent and control variables 
of the study (Zona, and Zattoni, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2009; Minichilli et al, 2012). 
Bivariate correlation was therefore used to test if the relationship between the 
variables is linear (an increase in one variable leads to an increase in the other or an 
increase in a variable leads to a variable decrease in the other variables) (Bryman and 
Duncan, 2005). Hence the use of bivariate correlation analyses provided a succinct 
assessment of the closeness or relationship among the variables and set the pace for a 
linear regression analysis to be conducted.
3.6.4 Regression Analysis
To be able to explain the roles board of directors’ play in Cameroon, the various roles 
of boards identified in the literature and board process attributes derived from factor 
analyses was regressed against board performance variables (board commitment and 
critical debate ) while controlling for board interlock and industry regulations. The 
choice of regression for data analysis is because it can explain variance as much as 
possible by fitting a straight line as close to all data points as possible (Sapford, 2007; 
Bryman and Duncan, 2005; Easterby-Smith et al., (2008). Using ordinary least 
square regression (OLS) method, three models where developed to model the various 
board tasks. This regression method is consistence with studies that have attempted to 
understand board task performance (Kula, 2005; Minichilli et al, 2007; Minichilli et 
al, 2009). The base model (Model I), was intended to show the effect of individual 
board task and process attribute variables on board commitment as the performance 
variable. Model II considers an additional independent variable (board critical
debate) to test the predictive power of the board task and process attribute variables 
on the selected independent variables. Finally the third model (Model III) includes 
board interlock and industry regulations as control variables.
Model I (basic model) was:
Pc  =  a +J3 jX+ s
Where Pc is the dependent variables i.e. board task variable {behavioural, output, 
strategic control, advisory, strategic participation, networking and stakeholder task) 
or process attributes {strategic focus, efficiency and access to information’, internal 
focus, internal efficiency and consistency; performance evaluation; and external 
focus and fiduciary responsibilities), a is the constant term, Pi is the beta coefficient 
of X  (board commitment) and s is the error term which is further broken down into 
the following disturbance terms.
E  =  U+ V
Model II
Pc = a +fiiX+ P2Y+ s
Where, p2 is the beta coefficient of second independent variable Y  (board critical 
debate).
Model III
Pc = a +faX+ fi2Y+ p sR + p4I + e
Where, P3 and p4 are the beta coefficient of control variables R (Industry regulation) 
and I  (Board interlocks).
3.7 Qualitative Data Analysis -Thematic Data Analysis
The data analysis began with a full word verbatim transcription of interview data into 
textual data for easy interpretation. The researcher manually transcribed the interviews
recording so as to be satisfactorily acquainted with the data. Conscious of the fact that 
there are varied methods of analysing qualitative data, (Easterby-Smith, 2008, p. 172 ), 
this research employed a thematic data analysis approach to analyse the qualitative 
data. This method was chosen because it allowed the researcher to identify, analyse 
and report patterns or themes within the interview and fields note data collected 
(Braune and Clark, 2006). Adopting this method to interrogate interview data to 
articulate participant’s expressions gives more holistic understanding of the issue under 
study which is lacking in some quantitative studies. A theoretical thematic analysis was 
employed to identify any patterns that capture the objectives of the study (Boyatzis, 
1998; Braune and Clark, 2006). As Braune and Clark, (2006), thematic analysis is 
criticized for its flexibility which may lead to multiple interpretations which may 
impair consistency. To overcome this, the researcher constantly referred back to the 
theory and patterns developed within the theories to enhance the results of the analysis 
process (Braun and Clarke, 2006).
The researcher followed the generic analytical framework outlined in table III below 
as outlined in Creswell (2003, p. 191).
Table 3: Thematic Analysis of Data
Interview data collected and transcribed into textual data, in preparation for
analysis.
   — --------------- — — -— — —      \
• Categories identified were grouped by common meanings, and thereafter 
assigned codes
. .  . . .  . . .   . . . ........... .... ...... ... ... ...
   — .— ,— .— _ — .—  -— —   — —   -------------
• Researcher reads through transcribed data trying to identify and link emerging 
concepts.
    ... ., .... ....    ... . .  , .
Categories under each code were assigned a theme, and connected into a 
storyline to give detailed description backed by evidence from respondents' 
verbatim
Meaningful patterns identified from the preceding stage, and relating to 
particular concepts of phenomena were then reported in narrative form.
Finally, the interview data collected was interpreted to answer the research 
questions following the theoretical lens adopted, and backed by prior 
quantiative findings and prior research.
3.8 Limitation of Research Method
The main limitation for this study is the small sample size for the questionnaire survey 
that was due to time constraints within which the study data collection was conducted. 
However due to careful sampling, the sample size was representative o f  the various 
sectors within the Cameroonian economy. However this study benefits from the use 
of  interviews, field notes and documentary data to complement the small sample size 
of the questionnaire (Punch, 2005; Loraine et al., 2010, p.20.)
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS and INTERPRETATION 
4.0 Introduction
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the data analysis results starting with 
quantitative data analysis results, which will cover the descriptive statistics, factor 
analysis, correlation and regression analysis and pattern analysis. Within the 
descriptive statistics demography and experience of the sample population and 
descriptive of variables will be presented. This is followed by factor analysis results, 
then discussion of correlation and regression results. The quantitative results section 
will end with discussing of theoretical or board role patterns as proposed in chapter II. 
The next section which is the qualitative results section will discuss the interpretation 
of interview data in response to the research questions outlined in the chapter I, patterns 
as developed within the various theories in chapter II and will provide evidence to 
supplement the quantitative results and discussions.
4.1 Quantitative Results
The subsequent sub sections will discuss the descriptive statistics, factor analysis, and 
correlation and regression results of the study. All of these analyses were done using 
SPSS statistical software version 21.
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Sample Demography and Experience
As discussed above the study included 31 executive directors across the different 
sectors of the economy. To capture the demographic characteristics and experience of 
the sample population, directors were asked about their gender (male or female). 
Directors were also asked to indicate which age bracket they belong to, their highest 
level of education, longevity in the company, longevity as an executive director in the 
company and if they are board members on boards of other companies(See Appendix 
Ill-Table 7 : Directors Demography and Experience,pp.80.)
From the tables, the sampled population shows that 23 per cent of the directors who 
responded to the questionnaire were female and 77 per cent were male. Amongst the 
directors, 32% were within the age bracket 51-60 meanwhile 29%, 26% 13% were 
age brackets 41-50, 31-40 and 20-30 respectively. With respect to education level of 
the directors in the study, 36% had a Master’s degree, 32% had undergraduate degree, 
and 13% had other qualifications not listed amongst the categories, 10 % had 
qualifications below the undergraduate level and 3 % had professional qualification. 
42%, 29%, 16%, 13% of the directors have been working for their current 
organisations for 0-5 years, 6-15 years, above 20 years and 16-20 years respectively. 
With respect to haven held the position of an executive director in their current 
organisations, 58% have been executive directors in their current organisation for 0-5 
years, while 32%, 7% and 3 % have been executive directors in their current company 
for 6-15 years, above 20 years and 16-20 years respectively.
4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Board Role Variables Items
Among the 25 items, the highest mean value of the responses ranges from 4.6 to 2.9. 
76 per cent of the mean responses are in agreement with the statements while 24% of 
the mean responses were within the neutral rating (see Appendix V: Table 9- 
Descriptive Statistics for Board Function Items, pp.83). Worthy of note is that 8 out of 
9 of the items under the control task of boards have the highest mean responses. This 
means directors agree more with statements relating to control tasks.
To be able to verify the mean distribution across the various task identified from the 
theoretical perceptive, the mean of behavioural, output and strategic control was 
computed to form the set CONTROL, the mean of advisory and strategic participation 
task was used to compute the set SERVICE, network task and stakeholder task were 
called NETWORK and STAKEHOLDER respectively. As table 3 below indicates, 
the mean results shows that the board spends most of its
time on controlling the management of firms (CONTROL, 4.35) which is followed by 
involvement of boards in protecting the expectations of stakeholders 
{STAKEHOLDER, 3.64), followed by boards involvement in advising and 
contributing to board strategic issues {SERVICE, 3.59) and the board performing a 
resource acquisition activities for the firm {RESOURCE, 3.37) (see table 3 below). 
Consistence with the mean responses of the 25 items discussed earlier, board control
task had the highest mean responses supporting that amongst the functions captured in 
I the questionnaire, directors responses are in agreement more on the control role of
I
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Board Role Variables
Board Task Variables Description Mean Median Mode SD Min Max
The amount o f time allocated by board to
controlling top management
(on a scale from 4.35 4 5 .48 3 5
1= “Strongly Disagree” to 5
CONTROL = “Strongly Agree
The amount o f time allocated by board
o protect interest o f stakeholders
(on a scale from 3.6 4 3 .71 2 5
1= “Strongly Disagree” to 5
STAKEHOLDER = “Strongly Agree”
The amount o f time allocated by board to
advice and contribute to strategic issues (on
i a scale from 3.6 4 2 .85 2 5
1= “Strongly Disagree” to 5
SERVICE = “Strongly Agree”
The amount o f time allocated by board to
resource acquisition (on a scale from 
1= “Strongly Disagree” to 5
3.4 3 4 1.17 1 5
RESOURCE = “Strongly Agree”
boards.
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
4.1.3 Factor Analysis Results
As discussed before of a possibility of conceptual overlap of the variables, an attempt 
was made to identify a parsimonious combination of variables fundamental to the 
primary dimensions underlying the set of 25 questions. An exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) beginning with PCA was performed with Varimax rotation on the total 
of 25 items within board role to capture some board process attributes (Kula, 2005, 
Minichilli et al., 2012). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy was 0.511 and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity showed strong significance,

which meant further analysis, could be done. The results produced 7 factors, which 
had an eigenvalue greater than 1 and explained of the total variance 75.4%, of the 
total variance. Only items, which had loadings of at least 0.40, were retained. In cases 
of cross loadings, items were retained if the difference between the loading and other 
cross loadings were more than 0.30 (Mbzibain et al., 2013). Following from this, 3 
items with a loading less than 0.4 or a high cross loading were dropped. However a 
further confirmation using a scree plot showed that only four factors were to be 
extracted (Bryman and Cramer, 2009).
Following from this, a Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) with fixed factor extraction to 
extract just 4 factors was conducted. Continuous cross loadings of the items let to the 
removal of additional 5 items. The remaining 17 items loaded under 4 factors, which 
explain 63.35% of the total variance of the attributes, and this was confirmed with a 
scree plot (see Appendix IV: Table 8- Board Process Attribute Factors, pp.82). The 
first factor (STREFACINFO) consists of 5 items on the promotion of strategic 
initiatives, participating and implementation of long term strategic decisions and 
providing external legitimacy. Thus this factor was labelled strategic focus, efficiency 
and access to information (STREFACINFO). Factor two (INEFCONSIS) includes 
items on contribution and advises on management, legal, financial and taxation issues, 
defining activities of management and checking management behaviour and adequacy 
of briefing by management. This factor was labelled internal focus, internal 
efficiency and consistency (INEFCONSIS). The third factor labelled performance 
evaluation (PEREVA) comprise of being acquainted with the financial position of the 
firm and accountability to the shareholders. The last factor labelled external focus 
and fiduciary responsibilities (EXFOFURES ) is comprise of prioritising, ensuring for 
the interest and satisfaction of different stakeholders and collaborating with 
management on market issues. A test of internal reliability of this factors showed by 
the Cronbach alpha were 0.842, 0.750, 0.936, 0.755, respectively exhibiting a high 
level of reliability.
This result indicates that, boards in Cameroon do not perform a particular role in 
isolation of others. Indeed the factor analysis results shows that board can perform 
different functions as the firm’s needs changes.
4.1.4 Correlation Results
Results of the correlation between the variables are presented in table 9 (see Appendix 
VI: Table 10 - Correlation Results, pp.85). The significance level of the correlations 
was measured using Pearson correlation coefficient. A double asterisk (**) indicates 
significance at 1% two-tailed test and a single asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5% 
two-tailed test. Correlation results showed that; board output control task is positively 
correlated to board strategic control task (0.398*). Behavioural control task was 
correlated to strategic control (.0620*) and output control (0.663**). The advisory 
function of board was correlated to strategic control (0.371*), output control (0.454*) 
and behavioural control (0.619**). Board networking role was correlated with board 
strategic control (0.598**), behavioural control (0.485**) and advisory function 
(0.636**). Board stakeholder task was correlated with board behavioural control 
(0.453*), advisory role (0.636**) and network function (0.484**). Board committed 
correlated with board strategic control (0.572**), output control (0.395*), behavioural 
control (0.426*), advisory role (0.508**), and networking (0.619**). Board critical 
debate did not have any significant correlation with any of the board task. Board 
interlock correlated negatively with board critical debate (-0.385*). Industry 
regulation did not correlate with any of the board task variables, process variables and 
performance variables.
Board strategic participation correlated with board strategic control (0.540**), 
behavioural control (0.359*), advisory role (0.395*), networking (0.601**), and board 
commitment (0.400*). Correlation amongst the various board task showed very high 
correlations which is expected as it has been argued that active boards perform the 
various board tasks and will rarely carry out this task selectively or in isolation to 
each other (Kula, 2005; Huse, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2009). The highest correlation 
between the board task variables was seen between board behavioural control and 
board output control (0.663**). The highest correlation between the board task 
variables and board performance variables was recoded between board network 
function and board commitment (0.619**).
With regards to board process attributes, board strategic focus, efficiency and access 
to information correlated with board strategic control (0.551*), advisory role (0.434*), 
networking role (0.729**), stakeholder role (0.428*), commitment (0.476**) and
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strategic participation (0.957**). Board internal focus, internal efficiency and 
consistency correlated with board strategic control (0.478**), output control 
(0.585**), behavioural control (0.834*), advisory role (0.867**), networking 
(0.593**), stakeholder task (0.499**), commitment (0.404*). Board performance 
evaluation showed correlation with board strategic control (0.367*), output control 
(0.761**), behavioural control (0.670**), commitment (0.402*) and board internal 
focus, internal efficiency and consistency (0.420*). Finally, board external focus and 
fiduciary responsibilities recorded correlation with board behavioural control 
(0.462**), advisory role (0.650**), networking (0.544**), stakeholder task (0.893**), 
commitment (0.356*), strategic focus, efficiency and access to information (0.417*) 
internal focus, internal efficiency and consistency (0.465*). The highest correlation 
between board task variables and board process attributes was recorded between 
board strategic participation and strategic focus, efficiency and access to information 
(0.957**). Furthermore, the maximum correlation between board performance 
variables and board process variables was seen between strategic focus, efficiency and 
access to information and board commitment. Between the board attributes, the 
highest correlation was recorded between board internal focus, internal efficiency and 
consistency and board external focus and fiduciary responsibilities (0.465**).
The correlations result confirms the factor analysis results indicating that boards 
perform multiplicity of task as there is high correlation between the various roles of 
boards. This results is however not surprising given that, active boards are expected 
to be performing all service, network and control tasks, and will rarely perform these 
functions selectively (Minichilli et al.,2009; 2012).
4.1.5 Regression Results
As discussed in chapter III, to be able to explain the roles board of directors’ play in 
Cameroon which is the main aim of this study and to answer the main research 
question; the various roles of boards identified in the literature and board process 
attributes derived from factor analyses was regressed against board commitment 
(Model I), critical debate (Model II) and then controlled for board interlock and 
industry regulations (Model III). This will explain if the various patterns developed 
within the various theories in chapter II is statistically supported or refuted.
Table 4, pp.55 below shows the standardized betas, R2, Adj R2, and significance of the 
regression. Grounded on the preliminary analysis (means, standard deviations and 
bivariate correlation coefficients for the variables used in the regression analyses), a 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analyses was conducted after each regression model 
to test for multi-collinearity. The VIF values range from 1 to 1.2, signifying that 
multi-collinearity was not a problem in the study (Neter, et cil, 1996; Kula, 2005; 
Minichilli et al., 2012). The preceding discussion will present the regression results in 
light with the various patterns that were developed within the different theories of CG.
4.1.5.1 Agency Theory Pattern
As discussed in the literature agency theory argues for the, control role of boards of 
directors and therefore directors are task to monitor management behavioural, 
organisational output and control management strategy in so as to maximise 
shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
As discussed above, agency theory control task was measured using three variables; 
behavioural, output and strategic control. The first regression considers the 
behavioural control as the dependent variable and board commitment as independent 
variable. This showed an Adj R of 0.153**. The subsequent two models showed a 
very weak and insignificant Adj R of 0.126 and 0.166 and an F change of 0.103 and 
1.669 respectively. However in the third model, regulation as a control variable was 
statistically significant at -0.302*(10%). This means that there is a negative 
relationship between industry regulation and board behavioural control task. Hence 
regulation inhibits board behavioural control. The first model is more robust than the 
latter two models as it has an F- change of 6.426** and is statistically significant at 
5%. More specifically it shows that board commitment (0.426**) has a positive 
impact on board behavioural control. All the models show that commitment is 
positively related to board behavioural control.
In regards to board output control, the regression models within this role are almost 
identical to the behavioural control. The first model is more robust with an Adj R of 
0.127** and F-change of 5.351 which is significant at 5% .The subsequent two 
models show very limited predictive power in the regression with insignificant Adj R 
of 0.105 , 0.036 with F-change value of 0.103 and 0.003 respectively. This indicates 
that similar to board behavioural control, board commitment has a positively impact
on the board output control function and this is the case across all the three regression 
models.
Furthermore, the third set of regression within agency theory is that of strategic 
control. Like the two control functions above, Model I shows a stronger predictive 
power than Model II and III. The later models have an Adj R2 of 0.287 and 0.139 with 
F-change value of 0.288 and 0.169 respectively. However model I has an Adj R2 of 
0.305*** and F-change of 14.135*** which is statistically significant at 1%. The 
rational is that board strategic control has a positive and strong significant relationship 
with board commitment.
From the regression analysis within board control function, it can be seen that the 
model I has a strong predictive power in all the regressions across the different control 
task of board. Interestingly, board commitment is highly associated with all the board 
control functions while board critical debate does not show any statistical significant 
relationship with any of control task. With regards to the control variables, only board 
output control had a statistical significant negative relationship with industry 
regulation. Among the control task, strategic control shows the highest adjusted R2 
(0.305***) with F-change of 14.135***. Hence from this analysis, it can be seen that 
pattern la “BODs commitment is positively associated with board monitoring and 
controlling management strategy, remuneration, behaviour and output and in so 
doing maximise shareholders value” is supported by the regression results. Pattern 
lb (BODs involvement in critical debate is positively associated with board 
monitoring and controlling management strategy, remuneration, behaviour and 
output and in so doing maximise shareholders value) was not supported by the 
regression results. Hence it is evident that boards in Cameroon are committed to 
performing control functions. This is also supported by the mean responses, which 
were high on board control function and correlation results, which showed a very 
strong positive association between board commitment and board control functions.
4.1.5.2 Stewardship Theory Pattern
From a stewardship perspective, it is expected to see a pattern between board advisory 
and strategic participation role with board commitment and board critical debate as 
presented in patterns 2a and 2b respectively.
From table 4, pp.55, it can be seen in the first regression model that board advisory 
role had a positive and significant relationship with board commitment with the Adj 
R2 of 0.233*** and F-change of 10.110*** and significant at 1%. In the second 
model, advisory role was still statistically significantly related to board commitment 
but not with critical debate. The Adj R2 was 0.206 with insignificant F-change of 
0.013. Model three with the addition of controls showed small change (Adj R2 = 
0.219, F-change = 1.232) as compared to the former model but no significant change 
as compared to model I. The first model is more robust and significant than the 
proceeding models.
Like the advisory role, strategic participation showed a more robust model I than the 
latter two models. The Adj R2 for model I is 0.131** with F-change of 5.513** which 
was statically significant at 5%. This model shows that strategic participation is 
strongly related to board commitment. Model II with the addition of board critical 
debate, commitment was still significant while critical debate was not; with a fall in 
Adj R2 (0.104) and weak F change (0.149). Again with the addition of control 
variables, model III was less predictive than model I but more predictive than model 
II though insignificantly.
Similar to board control function, board service function showed a positive and
significant association with board commitment though the advisory role had a greater
• 0 • • • ♦ •Adj R than the strategic participation task. Model I in both tasks was more predictive
than the other two models. Hence pattern 2a “BODs commitment is positively related 
to providing advice, support and counsel on strategic decision making to top 
management team to augment the quality o f organisational decisions” is supported 
by the regression model. Correlation results as discussed above also confirmed tis 
association between board commitment and board service functions.
4.1.5.3 Resource Dependency Theory Pattern
With regards to RDT, which suggests that, the board plays a crucial role in linking the 
firm to necessary resources (Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus it 
is expected that board-networking task is associated to board commitment and board 
critical debate as presented in patterns 3 a and 3b respectively. Regression results 
show similar results to previous theories, model I showed a more robust regression 
than II and III. Model I reveal that board networking has a positive significant
association with commitment (Adj R2 = 0.362***, F-change = 18.042***) which is 
significant at less than 1%. This pattern continues in model II and III though the 
predictive power of the latter two models was less robust. Hence pattern 3 a is 
supported by the regression.
4.1.5.4 Stakeholder Theory Pattern
Finally the last pattern, from the stakeholder theory which opines for the 
consideration of stakeholder interest (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984; 
Freeman and Gilbert, 1987; Freeman and Evans; 1990) we expect that the will be an 
association between the consideration of stakeholders interest with board commitment 
and critical debate. Consistent with the preceding theories, board stakeholder role 
was positively related to board commitment though significant at 10% across all the 
models. Model I was more predictive and significant at 10% (Adj R2 = 0.062*, F- 
change = 2.968*) than model II and III. As there was no significant association 
between stakeholder role and critical debate, it can be observed that only pattern 4a 
was supported by the regression.
4.1.5.5 Synopsis of Board Role (Theory) Patterns
Overall the data reveals that all of the board roles as identified by the various theories 
have a positive and significant relationship with board commitment (pattern la, 2a,
3a, 4a). The networking task showed the highest predictive power than the other 
functions of boards, which confirms the correlation results presented earlier. This was 
followed by strategic, advisory, behavioural control strategic participation, and output 
control and stakeholder task respectively. None of the regressions showed any 
significant relationship between the task variables and critical debate. With regards to 
control variables, only output control had a statistical significant negative relationship 
with industry regulation. These results are supported by the descriptive statistics, 
which showed that all the tasked identified had a mean response, which were more in 
agreement to the various task identified. In addition correlation results confirm the 
regression results, which indicate boards in Cameroon are committed in performing 
multiple functions.
4.1.5.6 Board Process Attribute Patterns
As discussed before, due to the possibility of conceptual overlap of the variables 
under study, an attempt was made to identify a parsimonious combination of variables 
fundamental to the primary dimensions underlying these factors. Four factors were
extracted through factor analysis (FACT 1: strategic focus, efficiency and access to 
information; FACT 2: internal focus, internal efficiency and consistency; FACT 3: 
performance evaluation; FACT 4: external focus and fiduciary responsibilities). The 
results of the regression are shown in 4, pp.54 below. Among the board process 
attributes, board strategic focus, efficiency and access to information (FACT 1) had 
the highest predictive power over board commitment (Adj R2 of 0.199*** and F- 
change of 8.475***) significant at 1%. This was followed by board internal focus, 
internal efficiency and consistency (FACT 2) with Adj R2 of 0.134 and F-change of 
5.659** and significant at 5%. Board performance evaluation (FACT 3) also showed 
a positive association with commitment (Adj R2 of 0.133** and F-change of 5.590**) 
significant at 5%. The last was board external focus and fiduciary responsibilities 
(FACT 4) which revealed an Adj R2 of 0.096 and F-change of 4.203** and significant 
at 5%. As with the board task variables, the process attributes showed a strong 
predictive power of Model I. None of the process attribute variables had a significant 
relationship with board critical debate, board interlock and industry regulation within 
the significant brackets.
The regression results show consistency with the factor analysis and correlations 
results. The results show board commitment to be a better measure of board role than 
board critical debate as board commitment showed the strongest and most significant 
influence on board attributes and all board functions considered in the research. The 
following section will present the qualitative results to harmonise or complement the 
quantitative results presented above.
Table 5: Regression Results
Variables
Com m itm ent
Critical
Debate
Interlock Regulation
R-
Square
Adj R- 
Square
F Change Sig
I 0.426** 0.181 0.153** 6.426** 0.017**
Behavioural Control II 0.435** 0.056 0.184 0.126 0.103 0.751
III 0.452** 0.039 -0.082 -0.302* 0.277 0.166 1.669 0.208
I 0.395* 0.156 0.127** 5.351** 0.028**
Output Control II 0.378* -0.096 0.165 0.105 0.301 0.587
III 0.378* -0 . 1 0 1 -0.013 -0.007 0.165 0.036 0.003 0.997
I 0.572*** 0.328 0.305*** 14.135*** .0 0 1 ***
Strategic Control II 0.587*** 0.084 0.335 0.287 0.288 0.596
III 0.588*** 0.062 -0.065 -0.076 0.343 0.242 0.169 0.845
I 0.508*** 0.259 0.233*** 1 0 . 1 1 0 *** 003***
Advisory II 0.512*** 0.019 0.259 0.206 0.013 0.911
III 0.531*** 0.034 0.005 -0.254 0.323 0.219 1.232 0.308
I 0.400** 0.160 0.131** 5.513** 0.026**
Strategic Participation II 0.388** -0.068 0.164 0.104 0.149 0.702
III 0.370** -0.169 -0.254 0.017 0 . 2 2 0 0 . 1 0 0 0.924 0.409
I 0.619*** 0.384 0.362*** 18.042*** 0 .0 0 0 ***
Networking II 0.629*** 0.055 0.386 0.343 0.135 0.716
III 0.630*** 0.047 -0.025 -0.044 0.389 0.295 0.049 0.952
I 0.305* 0.093 0.062* 2.968* .096*
Stakeholder Task II 0.327* 0.129 0.109 0.045 0.507 0.482
III 0.319* 0.087 -0.106 0.007 0.119 -0.017 0.143 0.867
Strategic focus, efficiency 
and access to information.
I
II
III
0.476***
0  4 7 7 ***
0.456***
0.009
-0.086 -.227 .092
0.226
0.226
0.281
0.199
0.171
0.171
8.475***
0.003
0.998
0.007***
0.956
0.382
Internal focus, internal 
efficiency and consistency
I
II
III
0.404**
0.423**
0.438**
0.113
0.094 -0.083 -0.268
0.163
0.176
0.250
0.134
0.117
0.134
5.659**
0.417
1.283
0.024**
0.524
0.294
I 0.402** .162 .133 5.590** .025**
Performance evaluation II 0.387** -.086 .169 .109 .243 .626
III 0.390** -.069 .043 - . 0 0 2 .170 .043 .025 .975
External focus and fiduciary 
responsibilities
I
II
III
0.356**
0.341*
0.338*
-0.084
-0.089 -0.005 0.045
0.127
0.134
0.136
0.096
0.072
0.003
4.203**
0.224
0.030
0.049**
0.640
0.970
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4.2 Interpreting Qualitative Data
Proceeding from the quantitative results and discussion above, in this section quotes from 
interviewee accounts and the findings relating to CG and role of boards have been 
included in the interpretation to support the finding of the quantitative results. Consistent 
with its objectives, the research reports the live experiences of executive directors in a 
Cameroonian context. Other themes related to board of directors such as board 
composition, board size, organisational CG etc. emerged from the interviews however 
because of the scope of this study; the researcher narrowed the themes to be presented 
in the research to fit the research objectives therefore those themes which are not 
directly related to answer the research question are not part of this report (see 
interview questions and profile of directors in appendix X and XI, pp.94, 95 
respectively).
4.2.1 Wider Perspectives of Corporate Governance in Cameroon
Research Question I: How do directors perceive corporate governance 
process in Cameroon?
To be able to fulfil the objectives of the research and to give an overall context within 
which this research is conducted, this sections focuses on directors meaning of CG, 
CG process and local CG regulation. This will therefore provide an overall 
understanding of the context of CG in Cameroon and will provide the background and 
set the pace for the next section which is to understand the function of BODs.
4.2.1.1 Meaning of Corporate Governance
The interviews began by seeking to find out what CG means to the respondents. In 
this regard, interesting revelations that were observed by the researcher across the 
various responses to the meaning of CG were both complementary and contrasting. 
For example a respondent define CG as:
“The set o f regulations that define how a structure is going to be run, all the various 
components o f the structure from the shareholders, to the board, to management, to 
heads o f department, it defines the rides that govern the life o f that structure ” 
(CGPB1, large privately owned national bank).
Notable responses to the meaning of CG from other respondents include;
“Set o f  rules ... set up, to guide, to mitigate possible risks” (CGPB2, medium size 
privately owned national banking institution).
“Rules to make sure that institutions are properly run with certain laid down ethics, 
that they are respected... so that the people, the stakeholders and shareholders, 
everybody at the end o f the day is fairly treated. ”(CGPT, large privately owned 
national transport firm).
Interestingly the first two excerpts are from respondents from the banking sector 
however their definition of CG differs as the first excerpts look at CG as rules that guide 
the running of a firm from shareholders down to departmental heads. While excerpt two 
define CG as rules in place in order to alleviate organisational risk. Third respondent from 
transport sector defines CG from a stakeholder point of view but goes further to 
complement the fair treatment of stakeholders. Another interesting excerpt that 
complements excerpt three define CG to be:
“Rules in place to ensure transparency and provide the necessary check and balances 
which allows any stakeholder to be able to check the surges, excesses o f  
management” (CGPOG, Multinational oil and gas firm).
It is peculiar that respondents from the banking sector opine CG from an internal 
perspective while respondents from other sectors opine CG from both internal and 
external perspective. For example excerpt two and four argue for possible risk mitigation; 
however the former is for the shareholders while the latter is for stakeholders. This 
various definition of CG by directors is reflective of board roles identified in the 
quantitative results. The meanings associated to CG laid the basis to assess CG 
implementation in Cameroon and will show case how the different meanings are 
reflective of the level of CG implementation as discussed in the subsequent section.
4.2.1.2 Corporate Governance Implementation Process
After exploring the meaning associated to CG, the interview progress to understand 
the general perception of directors regarding CG process in Cameroon. Most of the 
responses from the interviews showed a somewhat general consensus on the state of 
CG in Cameroon. A CEO had this to say about CG process in Cameroon;
“I t ’s still embryonic, rudimentary at best because this is a concept that is gaining 
grounds but i t ’s taking, perhaps much longer because the sensitisation process, to me, 
is a bit slow” ( CGPB1, large privately owned national bank) .
According to this respondent, Cameroon is very much behind when it comes to CG 
due to the fact the sensitisation process is very slow therefore making it difficult for 
implementation and accountability. When asked why the process of CG in Cameroon 
was slow, another CEO this time from agroindustry sector owned by the state had this 
to say;
“In Cameroon Ifeel, to be honest, I  think we still have quite some distance to cover... 
the issue is not writing a code, i t’s not coming out with procedures, i t’s a question o f  
mentality, in Cameroon, there are many things that are wonderfully written but they 
must be enforced ”(CGPAIN 1, state owned large national agroindustry firm).
The above quotation indicates that CG in Cameroon is at an infancy stage and needs 
careful attention and enforced implementation guidelines if good CG is to be 
achieved. However, another respondent shared similar views but goes further to opine 
that CG process and implementation in Cameroon depends on the deferent sectors and 
highlighted lack of accountability within government owned firms.
“ Within the public sector, pretty much, I  mean we all know the story, you know, you 
have lack o f accountability, responsibility, transparency so basically the key pillars 
within CG are lacking... I  think we are at infancy stage ... some organisations are 
well advanced but i f  you take everything as a whole, as a country, we are still at 
infancy” (CGPB3, large multinational bank).
This opinion by the later excerpt was echoed by majority of respondents. The account 
of interviewee CGPB3 might also be interpreted to suggest that companies in Cameroon 
apply different CG regulations as discussed in the next section. It also supports the 
multifunction of board in the quantitative results as the functions board perform are 
reflective on the level at which CG is seen and implemented.
4.2.1.3 Corporate Governance and Regulation
Some scholars have argued for the need for government intervention regulation for 
effective CG especially in the banking sector (Mullineux, 2006). With this in mind, 
the researcher asked directors how their various firms were regulated. Following are 
few excerpts in response;
“The CG guidelines we tend to follow are the basic regulatory requirements as per 
the recommendations in OHADA and then o f course we have the recommendations o f  
the regulators (COBAC), so those two are the guiding principles, we are a local 
entity, and CG did not emanate from this environment... ” (CGPB1, large privately 
owned national bank).
Another director from a multinational company had this to say:
“We adhere to CG in both UK and OHADA in Cameroon. I t ’s more stringent to do it 
from both sides... in Cameroon we have laws, which are not stringent in Cameron, 
and in such cases we apply UK CG laws to help determine what the company does ” 
(CGPOG, large multinational oil and gas firm).
While all companies in Cameroon are compelled to follow the OHADA CG 
guidelines, when it comes to multi-nationals, in addition to the OHADA, they also 
implement other CG guidelines out of Cameroon and more importantly guidelines 
from the country of their parent company. In addition, banks are required to adhere to 
the OHADA and industry regulator guideline, which is the COBAC.
A respondent from a purely majority state owned firm had this to say:
“ We have the OHADA; we have the guidelines which are those instruments the tenant 
board has put in place as in the 1999 law” (CGPAIN3, large national agroindustry 
firm with government, local and foreign ownership)
From the later excerpt, state owned organisations are compelled to adhere to both the 
OHADA CG guidelines and the CG guidelines of LAW N° 99/016 of December 1999 
popularly known as the ‘1999 law”.
Generally, based on the evidence from interviewee feedback above, CG doesn’t have a 
push or drive of its own in Cameroon as most of the CG guidelines can only be found 
within general company laws and this was noted by one of the respondent also ;
“...the OHADA to a large extent covers some o f the issues... I  think that having had 
the OHADA law in place, there could have been a document fo r  CG, which now takes 
what OHADA has not addressed, it is addressed in CG fo r Cameroon” (CGAIN2, 
medium local agroindustry firm).
Director’s accounts also testify that CG is intertwined with general laws and industry 
regulations as such company executives are obliged to implement those guidelines. It 
is evident that CG lacks institutional identity in Cameroon and as such regulatory 
guidelines act as a support to CG. Company executive are obliged to adhere to CG as 
part of company law and regulatory guidelines. Consequently regulation enforcement 
is the key driver of CG adoption in Cameroon without which majority of firms might 
not comply with CG.
The evidence from director’s account capturing the wider context of CG in Cameroon 
supports the need for effective CG, which has been echoed by the government as a 
pre-requisite for effective implementation of the country’s goal for Strategic Growth 
and Employment geared towards transforming Cameroon into an emerging economy 
by 2035.
4.2.2 Role of Corporate Board of Directors
Research Question 2: What is the role o f  corporate board o f  directors?
As the first research questions had set the pace in understanding the context within 
which this research purports, the next question to the directors was then to capture the 
central theme of this study which is to understand the function of corporate board of 
directors in Cameroon. To capture the role of boards, an opened question was asked 
as part of the questionnaire on the role of boards. Some of responses will be discussed 
as a part of the different theoretical patterns alongside the interview responds to 
elucidate patterns.
4.2.2.1 Agency Theory Pattern
According to agency theory the role of the board of directors as a CG mechanism is to 
monitor and control management and in so doing reduce agency cost and increase 
shareholders value (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Huse, 2007).
Following from this premise, we will expect that director’s responses will reflect the 
control role of boards. A majority of responses to the open ended question in the 
questionnaire reflected an agency theory perspective. Some of the responses given 
by directors as part of the questionnaire includes;
“Plays a supervisory role to ensure policies are implemented and institution goals are 
achieved” (Respondent from the banking sector).
“Being a representation o f  the shareholders, the board oversee the activities o f our 
organisation in general, approves and sanctions decisions during board meetings ” 
(Respondent from oil and gas sector)
“The board defines the overall road map o f the company for management to execute, 
take decisions on the overall functioning o f the institution and involves in strategic 
control ”( Respondent from the transport sector).
The above responses and many others reflected a typical shareholder activism of 
boards as prescribed by agency theory. However, during the follow up interview, 
some interesting responses relating to board shareholder activism came up. Some of 
these reactions include:
“They (board) set up exactly what the institution has to achieve... in some cases check 
the excesses o f executive management, i f  there are actually any excesses it is exactly 
their role to control such excesses ” (CGPB2, privately owned national banking 
institution).
“The board is a rubber stamp o f the principal shareholder filled with cronies, it 
accommodates the interest o f  the major shareholders who appointed them... i f  you 
look at the structure o f the balance sheet, capital is small, deposit is big, so the 
stakeholder driving this institution would be depositors but the control is in the hands 
o f the shareholders” (CGPB1, large privately owned national bank).
Excerpt (CGPB2), is consistent to the previous three excerpts but further elucidate the 
role of boards to curb management opportunism by checking that management 
doesn’t go beyond shareholders interest in satisfying their personal goals at the 
expense of shareholder value creation as advocated by agency theory. It is very clear
from the later excerpt (CGPB1) that the board performs a control role but only to the 
extent that it is in line with the interest of the major shareholders. In this case minority 
shareholder and other stakeholder interest become relevant only when it doesn’t 
conflict with that of the major shareholders.
This view was supported by another interviewee who opines that majority 
shareholders often influence the functionality of the board and consequently its 
decisions making process which is characterised by a majority shareholder orientation 
and does hinders critical debates in board meetings as the opinions of management 
and or minority shareholder are irrelevant. A participant quoted an example where the 
board in the interest of the major shareholder approved non-performing loans which 
management and a few board members disagreed with and these non-performing 
loans are disproportionate and have become the biggest problem the bank faces.
In this type of organisational setting, conflict of interest between management, 
minority shareholders on one hand and the majority shareholder on another hand often 
spur. Unlike the assumption underlying agency theory that owners (shareholders) are 
diffused with little individual part of the ownership patterns, some Cameroon 
companies have concentrated ownership. As a result there is conflict of interest 
between the majority and minority shareholders. There is need for stronger 
regulations for protection of minority shareholders. In absence of such regulations the 
dual agency problems arise with the potential for serious principal-principal conflicts.
In a nutshell it is evident from interviewee’s account that boards perform a monitoring 
and control role, which does confirm the results of agency pattern in the quantitative 
findings.
4.2.2.2 Stewardship Theory Pattern
Contrary to agency theory, stewardship theories opine that the role of the board is to 
actively assess and choose between strategic alternatives developed by managers of 
the organisation and provide ideas to enhance the quality of strategic decision-making 
(Donaldson, 1990; Davis et al., 1997., Daily et cil. 2003). On this basis, some 
respondents in the questionnaire gave accounts to clarify this premise:
“They (the board) have a coordination role over the whole institution ” (Respondent 
from public administration sector).
“The board sets the strategic direction ... they help in decision making and 
management reports on the implementation to them ” (Respondent from Sales and 
wholesale sector).
From the above responses it is evident that boards act as strategic advisers to 
management and coordinators of business strategy. They do not only provide 
management with counsel but also coordinate the implementation of the strategies 
arrive at in board meetings. Further evidence of the service role of boards was 
provided during interviews and some of these accounts include:
“They (board) set up the strategy, the vision and mission. This could be short term , 
medium and long term plans... they don't just assist in the set up and give to 
executive management, they follow up” (CGPB2, privately owned medium size 
national banking institution).
“The most essential role that the board plays, is to assist management, assist, and 
accompany management, particularly on strategic decisions” (CGPAIN1, large 
national agroindustry firm).
“The board provides strategy, providing direction to management strategy, being the 
flag  bearers o f CG” (CGAIN2, medium local agroindustry firm)
The interviewee responses point to the fact that the board is part of the strategy 
development and implementation of the firm. The board assist and provide direction 
and orientation to management for the continuous survival of organisations. Another 
interviewee added that the board is involve in strategic decision-making and advises 
management base on management ideas. In a nutshell, as exposed by the 
interviewees, the board actively assess and assist management select between 
strategic alternatives developed by management and provide ideas to enhance the 
quality of strategic decision-making. This thus goes to support the stewardship pattern 
role of boards providing evident to support the quantitative research findings that 
showed that boards are committed to providing advisory services to management as 
needed.
4.2.2.3 Resource Dependency Theory Pattern
Within the resource depends theory; BODs are well-known and powerful individuals 
who make use of their personal networks in order to provide legitimacy, reputation 
and stock of resources controlled by the firm (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Minichilli et al., 2009). Hence we will expect that BODs act as networking 
individuals and resourceful persons for the organisation. Some respondents in the 
questionnaire gave evidence to elucidate this board role. A respondent noted that;
“My board act as a lobbying group, who intervene to solve management issues and 
provide resources which are needed by the company ” (Respondent from an 
agroindustry firm).
According to this respondent the board uses it resources to help solve management 
issues and lobby resources from the external environment, which is much needed for 
the survival of the firm. An interviewee revealed that:
“Generally we bring in people who have knowledge and experience in our type o f  
business so that they can contribute to make sure things are effectively done, we have 
the audit organ o f the board who look at records more frequently and the head is 
someone who has quite a good knowledge o f auditing and is a board member, when 
issues o f  that nature (auditing) come up, we tap on these resources ” {CGPT, 
Respondent from the transport sector).
The response from CGPT above indicates the board resourcefulness and revealing 
how the composition of the board is reflective of the resource needs and expertise of 
the board members. Another interviewee also signposted the resource role of the 
board by indicating the composition of the board as follows;
“On the board ...we have experienced bankers, very experienced bankers; we have 
very experienced investment banker, very experienced CEO, and accountant 
(CGPB3, large multinational bank).
“The board composes o f varied directors with different experiences andfunctional 
background. It is necessary for the board to compose with people with varied 
technical background to help the company to be efficient... we have directors who are 
very experience in the oil and gas sector. It is the expertise that the board brings that
is important fo r  the company to perform well” (CGPOG, large multinational oil and 
gas firm)
According to excerpt CGPB3, the board is composed of experts with different 
technical skills which enables the development of sound strategic decisions and links 
the firm to external important resources needed by the company. Respondent CGPOG 
goes further to clarify the network or resource role of boards by confirming the 
expertise directors bring which is deem necessary for the firm to perform well. This 
therefore confirms the quantitative results, which indicated that board committed is 
positively associated with resource role of boards.
4.2.2.4 Stakeholder Theory Pattern
According to stakeholder theory, board role is to serve as the principal who manages 
and satisfy the interest of stakeholders to create new wealth and sustain competitive 
advantage (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984; Kaufman and Englander, 2011). 
It is therefore expected that board of director’s role will be coordinating the interest of 
core stakeholders. Responds to the open ended question gave some interesting results 
associated to this pattern. Some respondents accounted that the board;
“Oversees the activities o f the organisation and ultimately act on behalf o f and fo r  the 
benefit o f the stakeholders”. {Respondent from oil and gas sector)
Another noted respondent from the banking sector elucidated that the board functions 
in the:
“Approval o f  policies and ensure management acts in a way that is in the best interest 
o f the different stakeholders{Respondent from the banking sector)
Further evidence from interviews with directors went further to explain the 
stakeholder role of boards as some of the directors accounted that;
“They (board) don’t only look at how much profit we make for shareholders but also 
the local population, how they can benefit from the institution(CGPAIN3, large 
national agroindustry firm with government, local and foreign ownership).
According to this director the board functions to make sure that the environment in 
which the company operates is clean, the is provision for basic amenities such as 
water, good housing for employees, hospitals, clean working environment etc.
Another director from the oil and gas sector also hinted that:
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“When a decision is made it is fo r  the interest o f the stakeholders, which ultimately 
means the interest o f the company. The Board does this by looking at what is 
available and realistically endeavours to balance this interest by being pragmatic and 
try to come out with optimal decisions prioritizing the interest o f all stakeholders ” 
(CGPOG, large multinational oil and gas firm).
Following from this interviewee, in order to coordinating stakeholders interest, the 
board logically weighs the resources available to the firm on one hand and the claims 
needed by the various stakeholders on the other hand and make decisions which are 
optimal in satisfying various stakeholders. In addition, a director from a multinational 
bank also noted the board endeavours to make sure that decisions which are taken is 
reflective of the various stakeholders needs which comprises of shareholders, 
regulators, customers (depositors), employees and the society where they are 
operating. Consistent to this evidence, it is clear that the board functions in 
coordinating and making sure that interested parties in a firm are considered in 
decision making. This thus confirms the results of the quantitative pattern, which 
indicated that board of directors simultaneously with other roles, perform the 
stakeholder role.
4.2.3. Role of Corporate Board of Directors and Firm Performance
Research Question III: How does the role performed by BODs affect corporate 
performance?
Following from the understanding of the role of boards in Cameroon, the next step 
was to understand how these various roles performed by boards in Cameroon affects 
the performance of organisations. To achieve this, the researcher probed the directors 
to relate the role of boards to the overall performance of the company. Though all the 
directors agreed that the role of boards affect the performance of organisations, it is 
the divergence in their accounts that was really interesting, for example an 
interviewee from a large agroindustry firm had this to say about board function and 
positive firm performance;
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“ We have representatives (board members) o f various ministries so they assist to 
convey certain positions o f  the establishment to the various government agencies. In 
that case it affects (the firm) positively” (CGPAIN1, large national agroindustry firm)
A different director from a multinational oil and gas firm indicated a positive firm 
performance;
“The board functions in my opinion has a positive effect on our company 
performance and I  think this is really essential otherwise there is no need fo r  a 
board” (CGPOG, large multinational oil and gas firm).
Equally interviewees link their board functionality to a positive firm performance. 
However interviewee CGPAIN1 hinted that it is the representation of directors from 
various ministries, which helps link the firm to important government agencies, which 
enhances a positive firm performance. However, the CEO from the banking sector 
who reported of a majority shareholder oriented board reported a negative effect of 
the board and on the banks performance. He accounted that;
"... the board has been existing fo r the past years but today, the non-performing loans 
o f the corporation is so disproportionate... there are many files (loans) that the board 
definitely approve that are nonperforming today, it would be in my own situation the 
board acts negatively, impacts negatively on the life o f the corporation ” (CGPB1, 
large privately owned national bank).
According to this CEO, because the board approved loans, which management 
considered and a few directors representing minority shareholders considered risky, 
but because it was in the interest of majority shareholders, it was approved by the 
board and has become a serious problem to the organisation survival thus impacting 
negatively on the banks performance. This view of negative performance was echoed 
by another director who reported that the board is a creation by law and thus only 
come in to adopt budgets and check accounts as stipulated by law, which in her 
opinion, the lack of critical and strategic orientation of the board affects the 
performance of the company negatively.
From a neutral position, some directors also reported that the board has a neutral 
influence on the performance of the company since they don’t take part in the day to 
day running of the firm.
“Board members are not actually executive management so in no way do they 
actually influence the day to day management o f the bank. They set up the strategy 
that is passed on to the executive management and the executive management now 
have to implement the strategy ... that is what influences performance ” (CGPB2, 
privately owned medium size national banking institution).
Another director from a multinational banking institution who opines that board 
composition also supported the response by the latter interviewee and functions 
reflect the efficiency of the board but actual performance of the firm is attributed to 
management implementation of the board’s decisions.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
5.0 Introduction
This chapter summarises the research findings in both the quantitative and qualitative 
interpretations in relation to the research objectives. It will also present the 
conclusions arrived at vis-a-vis the research questions established in the introductory 
section of this research. Section one discusses the key findings of the study, while the 
subsequent, i.e. sections two and three will present the implications and limitations of 
the research findings and opportunity for future research respectively.
5.1 Summary of Findings
Following a review of extant literature on CG, it was evident that that prior research 
has predominantly been quantitative in nature. The review empirical literature showed 
mixed results about CG and firm performance nexus. It also indicates that very 
limited investigation has been conducted within emerging African economies. In 
addition, there is an almost absence of research to understand the role of corporate 
boards in Africa. With this in mind, this study was geared at conducting an explanatory 
research on CG and role of boards in Cameroon. The key question in this research was to 
understand the role of BODs by identifying the role of board as advocated by four CG 
theories and tests the best explanatory capabilities in the Cameroonian context. To be 
able to achieve this objective, three sub research questions to guide the investigation 
where developed by the researcher.
5.1.1 Research Question I- Wider perspective of CG
The first research question was aimed at contextualising CG in Cameroon. To be able 
to achieve this, the researcher collected rich interview data on the perception of 
executive directors relating to the meaning of CG, CG implementation process in 
Cameroon and CG and regulations in Cameroon. Evidence from participants revealed 
that; there were varied meanings attached to CG, which sometimes depend on the 
sectors to which the respondents are coming from. Though all participants echoed CG 
to be rules to control management, respondents from the banking sector viewed CG 
from an internal perspective as rules to protect shareholders interest while respondents
from other sectors view CG from both internal and external perspective as rules to 
safeguard the interest of not only the shareholders but those of other stakeholders.
Regarding CG implementation process, there was a general consensus that CG 
practices in Cameroon is very much nascent, which needs careful attention if the 
country is to meet its goal of becoming an emerging middle income economy by 2035 
(as discussed in chapter I, pp, 6). However, it was also revealed that different 
ownership structures, sectors and internalisation of firms have different level of 
implementation. Financial sector and multinational firms are seen to practice good CG 
while state owned firms are seen to lack accountability and transparency.
Concerning CG regulations, similar to CG process, interviewee accounts indicated 
that the application of regulatory guidelines differs between sectors, ownership and 
internationalisation of the firm. Banking sector firms are more regulated than firms 
from other sectors. Local firms apply local CG guidelines while multinational apply 
both local CG guidelines and CG guidelines from the country of parent company.
State owned firms follow CG guidelines as stipulated by the government 1999 law 
and general business law (OHADA) governing all firms in Cameroon. The most 
important revelation the researcher gathered from interviewee account was that CG 
does not have its own drive, thus corporate executive adhere to CG laws as part of the 
business law without which majority of firms will not comply with CG. Therefore in 
order for CG to be effective in Cameroon, there is a need to make CG very visible 
within Cameroon.
5.1.2 Research Question II- Role of Board of Directors
Research question II captured the main objective of this research which was to 
understand the role of BODs as derived from CG theories. Evidence from quantitative 
regression analysis indicated that boards in Cameroon perform multiple roles as 
identified by the various theories of CG. However, board resource or networking was 
highlighted to be the most important role performed by BODs in Cameroon, followed 
by strategic control, behavioural control, strategic participation, output control, and 
stakeholder task.
With regards to agency control, three roles were identified (strategic, behavioural and 
output control). Regression results showed that BODs are committed to providing the 
various control functions as identified in agency theory. However, strategic control 
was the most important control role performed by boards in Cameroon. Participants 
and interviewee accounts supported the regression results with most participants 
defining their board role within the control of management budget, strategy and 
behaviour. However, the interview results indicated that the principal -agent 
relationship of the Anglo-American CG model is not absolutely supported within the 
Cameroon context. Whereas the model assumes problem between shareholders and 
management, it fails to recognise other serious relationships such as principal- 
principal conflict whereby minority shareholders are been marginalised by majority 
shareholders. This finding is consistent with Morck et al., (2005); Young et al., (2008) 
who reported that, in developing economies where the institutional context makes the 
enforcement of agency contracts more problematic and costly, coupled with the 
absence of external governance mechanism, there is frequently serious conflicts 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (principal-principal 
conflict) .Hence there a need for stronger regulations for the protection of minority 
shareholders without which the dual agency problems arise with the potential for 
serious principal-principal conflicts
Similar to board control role, board service role as advocated by stewardship theory 
was another important role which executive directors identified as the function of 
their boards both in the quantitative and qualitative results. It was evident from the 
results that BODs are committed in providing support, advice and strategic direction 
to management. Interview results provided more clarity to the service role of boards 
as directors revealed that their boards are part of management strategic decision­
making and implementation.
With regards to board resource role opined by RDT, quantitative results showed that 
this was the most important function BODs in Cameroon are committed to perform. 
Interviewee account also indicates this trend. Directors accounted how the expertise 
and technical competence and network of their board members enable the company to 
benefit from external resources.
Finally, the stakeholder role of boards was also seen to be performed by directors in 
Cameroon in the quantitative results. Interviewing accounts revealed that in addition 
to the other roles performed by boards, the board ensures that the expectations of 
interested parties in a firm are met.
The findings within board role in this research are consistent which studies which 
discovered that boards do not only perform a particular role in isolation of the other 
(Minichilli et al., 2009; Kula; 2005; Zattoni and Zona, 2007). The results of the board 
process attribute which identified characteristics inherent in director’s role also 
showed that board in Cameroon perform a multiplicity of functions as the need arises. 
Though respondent’s accounts in the interview analysis were explained in relation to 
the various theoretical patterns, none of the interviewees revealed that his/her board 
limits its activities to a particular function. They all revealed a multiplicity of 
functions the board as needed.
5.1.3 Research Question III- Role of Board of Directors and Firm Performance
While prior research in CG has mainly used profitability, and, other market and 
accounting related measures such as ROE, ROA, EBIT, to gauge performance . In this 
study, the researcher used qualitative results based on director’s accounts and the 
results indicated that; the board functions have positive, negative and neutral effect on 
firm performance. Though to an extent this research is consistent with prior research 
findings results of CG and firm performance from quantitative findings, the results of 
this study goes deeper and provides an understanding on why this is so. These results 
pointed to the fact that, board roles’ depending on how it is executed does affect 
performance of firms. However, boards that perform various roles have a positive 
effect on firm performance but boards that are majority shareholder oriented and take 
majority shareholder desired decisions have detrimental effect on the firms’ survival.
5.2 Implications of Findings
The findings for this study have both practical and academic implications. Firstly, the 
research contributes to the limited literature on role of board of directors in Africa 
(see chapter II, pp.20). Secondly, this study contributes to the development of CG 
investigation through mixed method research and thus answers to the call for mixed 
method research to help in understanding CG issues (Huse et al., 2009; Zatonni et al.,
2013). Furthermore, the study challenged reliance of agency theory as the key 
theoretical approach in understanding CG issues and highlighted the fact that in 
emerging economies, a multi-theoretical approach is needed to understand CG (see 
chapter II, pp.l 1) (Young et al, 2008). Even within agency theory, this study exposes 
the fact that though agency theory is relevant in understanding principal-agent 
relationship, in emerging markets which are characterised by absence of external 
governance mechanism, there is frequently serious conflicts between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders which breeds other conflicts such as principal- 
principal conflict. In addition, this study challenges orthodox CG and performance 
nexus especially in Africa and highlight the need for CG scholars to return to the 
basics by understanding the behavioural aspects of boards if they are to make relevant 
meaning of CG and performance nexus. To the best of my knowledge, this study is 
the first of its kind to explore the role of board of directors in Africa and to have 
engaged in a purely mixed method research. Overall, this research shows that the 
predictors specifically board commitment has a higher explanatory capability of board 
role than critical debate.
Similarly, the findings of this study have some practical and policy implications.
As the fight against corruption in Cameroon has been echoed as a pre-requisite for an 
effective implementation of the strategy meant to transform the country into an 
emerging economy by 2035, this research highlights this need and goes further to call 
for a separate CG impetus in Cameroon if the country is to ensure accountability and 
transparency in the way firms operate. In order for CG to be effective in Cameroon, 
there is a need to make CG very visible. Secondly, this study points to the fact that, 
Cameroon as a developing country with concentration of ownership in some firms, 
there is a need to protect minority shareholders as control is mostly in the hands of 
majority shareholders. In addition, to ensure effectiveness of firms in Cameroon, 
owners of firms should hire directors who understand risk so that while they control 
management, they can effectively and efficiently contribute towards firm’s strategy 
and direction towards a superior firm performance. The study also suggest that , it is 
important for BODs to carefully consider the importance of creating a process 
oriented boardroom culture which encourages members commitment to board 
activities (Minichilli et al.,2009; Forbes and Milliken,1999). Consistent with past 
studies, these results indicates that creating an internal culture favouring active
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behaviours of board members is a key element for board effectiveness which serves 
the firm better (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Minichilli et 
a l, 2009).
5.3 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research
Similar to any social science research, this study also suffers from some limitations. 
Firstly, though the study provides some preliminary insights on how boards in 
Cameroon function, the choice of a single respondent being an executive director may 
imply the risk that these directors can provide idealized version of events. However as 
Minichilli et al., (2009) noted, the use of multiple respondents does have its 
limitations, and is to be expected to produce even more biases.
Finally, this study opens opportunity for prospective research in this area. First, this 
research had a limited sample size in the survey. This could have a possible impact on 
the research outcomes; hence there is a need for this study to be tested in a larger 
sample size. In addition, this results need to be further tested and explored in other 
African institutional settings or with respect to other classes of firms e.g. SME and or 
Micro Finance settings. In addition, this study adopted a cross-sectional research 
design, which may undermine board dynamic forces. Future longitudinal studies 
might improve our knowledge of board roles and it effect on performance in an 
African context. More so, as this study is the first of its kind to be conducted in an 
African context, future research should aim at understanding such board behavioural 
patterns and it effect on performance. Moreover, this research opens up opportunities 
for future research in CG using mixed method approach. Future research aimed at 
understanding interactions inside the boardroom should investigate the impact of 
context and processes on board role performance (Minichilli et al., 2009).
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Appendix II: Table 6 - Factors o f Board Task
Factors
Factor Cronbach KMO
loads Alpha Test
Percentage 
Eigen Variance 
value explained
Behavioural control
The board is actively involved in monitoring management behaviours
The board is actively involved in defining the activities of the CEO, divisional 
and functional managers
The board is actively involved in supervising the CEO/MD/GM 
The Board is accountable to the company's shareholders 
Output Control
The board ensures that the activities o f management are in line with 
organizational goals.
The board evaluates and approve management plans and budgets 
The board is kept informed of the financial position o f the company 
The board is sufficiently briefed by top management.
Advisory
The board contributes and advises on management issues
The board advises top management on financial issues
The board advise management on technical issues
The board contributes and collaborates with management on market issues
The board contributes and advises management on legal issues and taxation
Strategic Participation
The Board is actively involved in promoting strategic initiatives both inside 
and outside the company
’ The board is actively involved in the long-term strategic decision-making of the 
company
'Ihe board is actively involved in implementing long-term strategic decisions 
Networking
The board provides linkages to important external stakeholders
The board provides the firm with external legitimacy contributes towards
sustaining its reputation
The Board gathers outside information for the company 
Stakeholder Task
The board considers the interest o f other stakeholders in its strategic decision 
making
The board provides the company with legitimacy in its dealing with key 
stakeholders
The board prioritize among stakeholder groups and allocate rights and 
responsibilities among them accordingly
The board ensures the satisfaction o f all the company's stakeholders
The Board provides leadership by actively involving stakeholders in the 
decision making process of the company *
0.76
0.73
0.76
0.68
.793
.505
.792
.601
.614
.768
.830
.673
.734
0.94
0.89
0.91
.877
.821
.882
.762
.511
.757
.750
.644
0.71
0.61
0.77
0.90
0.82
0.71
0.63
0.65
0.77
0.72
0.71
0.73
2.16 53.94
1.87
2.51
2.39
46.81
2.65 52.97
83.61
2.22 74.04
47.87
Notes: Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization. N -3 1

Appendix Ill-Table 7 : D irectors Demography and Experience
DIRCTORS GENDER
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
Female 7 22.6 22.6 22.6
Male 24 77.4 77.4 100.0
Total 31 100.0 100.0
DIRECTORS AGE
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
20-30 4 12.9 12.9 12.9
31-40 8 25.8 25.8 38.7
41-50 9 29.0 29.0 67.7
51-60 10 32.3 32.3 100.0
Total 31 100.0 100.0
DIRECTORS LONGETIVITY IN THE COMPANY
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
> 20 5 16.1 16.1 16.1
0-5 13 41.9 41.9 58.1
16-20 4 12.9 12.9 71.0
6-15 9 29.0 29.0 100.0
Total 31 100.0 100.0
LONGETIVITY AS A DIRECTOR
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
+20 2 6.5 6.5 6.5
0-5 18 58.1 58.1 64.5
16-20 1 3.2 3.2 67.7
6-15 10 32.3 32.3 100.0
Total 31 100.0 100.0
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DIRECTORS INTERLOCK
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
No 23 74.2 74.2 74.2
Yes 8 25.8 25.8 100.0
Total 31 100.0 100.0
DIRECTORS EDUCATION
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
Below Undergraduate Degree 3 9.7 9.7 9.7
Undergraduate Degree 10 32.3 32.3 41.9
Master’s Degree 11 35.5 35.5 77.4
Doctorate Degree/PhD/DBA 2 6.5 6.5 83.9
Professional/Vocational Qualification 1 3.2 3.2 87.1
Other Qualifications 4 12.9 12.9 100.0
Total 31 100.0 100.0
Appendix IV: Table 8- Board Process Attribute Factors
Factors Factor
loads
Cronbach
Alpha
Eigen
value
Percentage
variance
explained
Cumulative
percentage
variance
F actor 1: Strategic Focus, Efficiency and A ccess to Information 0.842 5.334 31.377 31.377
Board promotes strategic initiative in and out o f the firm. .948
Board involves in the long term strategic decision o f the firm. .832
Board involves in the implementation o f long term strategic .770
decisions o f the firm.
Board provides external legitimacy. .552
Board provides firm with legitimacy in dealing with key .431
stakeholders.
F actor 2: Internal Focus, Internal Efficiency and Consistency. 0.75 2.381 14.005 45.382
Board contributes and advices on management issues. .681
Board advices on legal and taxation issues. .596
Board is sufficient brief by TMT. .568
Board monitors management behaviour. .542
Board advices TMT on financial issues. .422
Board defines the activities o f TMT. .413
F actor 3: Perform ance Evaluation 0.936 1.634 9.609 54.991
Board is kept informed o f the financial position o f the firm. .948
Board is accountable to shareholders. .882
F actor 4: External Focus and Fiduciary Responsibilities .755 1.422 8.362 63.353
Board prioritizes amongst stakeholder groups. .808
Board ensures the satisfaction o f all the firms’ stakeholders. .574
Board collaborate with TMT on market issues. .569
Board considers the interest o f all stakeholder in its decision .525
making process.
Appendix V: Table 9- Descriptive Statistics for Board Function Item s
Statement about board Function Source Mean Median Mode SD
The board is sufficiently briefed by top management. Minichili et al., 2009 4.6 5 5
0.72
The board is kept informed of the financial position o f the company
Minichili etal., 
2009 4.6 5 5 0.81
The board evaluates and approve management plans and budgets
Minichili et al., 
2009 4.6 5 5 0.67
The Board is accountable to the company's shareholders Kula,2005 4.5 5 5 0.81
The board ensures that the activities of management are in line with organizational goals. Minichili et al., 2009 4.4 4 5
0.62
The board actively monitors and evaluates the strategic decisions taken by management
Minichili et al., 
2009 4.3 4 4
0.54
The board is actively involved in monitoring management behaviours
Minichili et al., 
2009 4.3 4 4 0.82
The board is actively involved in supervising the CEO/MD/GM
Minichili et al., 
2009 4.2 4 4a
0.93
The board considers the interest o f other stakeholders in its strategic decision making Researcher 4.1 4 4 0.87
1
The board is actively involved in the long-term strategic decision-making o f the company
Minichili et al., 
2009 4.1 4 4a 1.15
The board provides the company with legitimacy in its dealing with key stakeholders Researcher 4.0 4 4 1.05
T|he board is actively involved in defining the activities of the CEO, divisional and functional 
managers
Minichili et al., 
2009 3.9 4 4 1.08
The board contributes and advises on management issues
Minichili et al., 
2009 3.8 4 4 1.01
The Board is actively involved in promoting strategic initiatives both inside and outside the 
company
Minichili et al., 
2009 3.7 4 4 1.13
The board provides the firm with external legitimacy contributes towards sustaining its reputation
Minichili et al., 
2009 3.7 4 4 1.25
The board ensures the satisfaction of all the company's stakeholders Researcher 3.6 4 4 1.15
The board is actively involved in implementing long-term strategic decisions
Minichili et al., 
2009 3.6 4 4a 1.43
1 he board contributes and collaborates with management on market issues
Minichili etal., 
2009 3.6 4 4 1.23
1 he board advises top management on financial issues
Minichili et al., 
2009 3.5 4 4 1.29
1 he board provides linkages to important external stakeholders Researcher 3.4 4 4 1.34
1 he board prioritize among stakeholder groups and allocate rights and responsibilities among them 
ccordingly Researcher 3.4 3 4
0.92
1 he board contributes and advises management on legal issues and taxation
Minichili etal., 
2009 3.3 4 4 1.34
1
tl
he Board provides leadership by actively involving stakeholders in the decision making process of 
le company Kula,2005 3.2 3 4
1.16
The Board gathers outside information for the company
Minichili et al., 
2009 3.0 3 4
1.48
The board advise management on technical issues
Minichili et al., 
2009 2.9 3 2 1.27
Note:
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
The descriptive statistics are connected with the various scores obtained through an assessment of each statement by executive 
directors on a five-point scale from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 =“strongly agree”. The maximum and minimum values are 5 
and 1, respectively, for each statement.
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A ppendix VII -  HREC Ethics A pproval M em orandum
O o
>
From
Email
Extension
Dr Duncan Banks
Chair, The Open University Human Research Ethics Committee
diBKan.banks@openaic.uk
591%
CClOl
o
Clxz
To Geofry Areneke, FBI
Ref
AMS/RED
Submitted
Date
Subject “The Hok of Board of Directors in Corporate Governance in 
Africa: Myth & Reality: Evidence from Cameroon, * 
HR£C/2G14/I673/Areneke/1
M e m o r a n d u m
25 March 2014
26 March 2014
This memorandum ts to confirm that the research protocol for the above-named research project, as 
submitted for ethics review, has been given a favourable opinion by the Open University Human Research 
Ethics Committee by Chair's action as it is thought to be low risk. There is one condition attached to this 
form;
You will need to provide evidence that the director of individual companies are happy for you to 
carry out the research on or about their premises.
Please make sure that any questions) relating to your application and approval are sent to Research-REC- 
ReviewgODen.ac.uk quoting the HREC reference number above, We will endeavour to respond as quickly as 
possible so that your research is not delayed in any way.
At the conclusion of your project, by the date that you stated in your application, the Committee would like 
to receive a summary report on the progress of this project, any ethical issues that have arisen and how they 
have been dealt with.
Regards,
Dr Duncan Banks 
Chair OU HREC
The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (number RC 000391), an exempt chanty in England & Wales and a 
chanty registered in Scotland (number SC 038302)
HREC_2014-1673-Areneke-1 -appravaJ-chatrs-acbon
Appendix VIII - Research Project Information and Consent Form
T he O p en  U n iv ersity  
B u s in e s s  S c h o o l
W sit on Ha II 
Mifton K e y n e s  
Unrted Kingdom  
M KT5AA
Te! + 44  (0) 1 90S  5 5 5  SSS 
Fax + 4 4  (0) 1 9 0 8  555  S3S 
www .o p e n . ac.u k.k> ub s
Research Project Information and C o n sen t Form
Project Title
T he R ole o f Board o f D irectors in C orporate G overn an ce in Africa; Myth & Reality: E vidence from  
C am eroon.
Name o f the R esearcher
Geofry Are re  fee— Master of R esearch Student (Business and Management), the Open University (UK). 
P urp ose  o f the R esearch
This research study is being conducted as part of the MRes programme, and thus is only purpose is to 
meet academic requirements. The main aim is to stimulate a richer arid deeper underslanding from 
research participants about the rote of corporate board of directors in corporate governance in Cameroon. 
The data shall be collected using both questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with directors of 
companies across different sectors of the economy.
Duration o f  the Interview
The questionnaires will typically take a maximum of 15-30 to fiflamJ the interviews are expected to  last for 
approximately 30 minutes to o re  hour. However, most participants will have to fill only the questionnaire.
B enefits to the Participants
As the research is a  phot to the future PhD study, at the moment the is no immediate benefits for the 
research participants, however a  summarised copy of the research report shall be provided to the 
participants on completion of the final report if they so  dies ire. It ts expected the results of this study will 
help to add to and encourage high quality research In the area of corporate governance and help 
enhance artd promote interesting debates between practitioners, academ ics and policy makers, and 
consequent ass is t In the adoption of goco corporate governance standards especially In Africa.
R isks to the Participants
Given the level of the research, participants involved in the study wifi face very minimal level of risks, and 
they will rot encounter any risks that m m  exceed the ris ks that they encounter in their daily routines. 
However, the researcher shall take due care to protect partcipansts from all types of psychological
T's open w".var$.ty & tco'pcrated sy  ^ova 
C'la'te* AC  000291 at e x e r t s  cnarty r Eng and 
&W3S=- 3”d a era-tv eg steed t  Scot ana ;sc 
03.5-002;
distress or any physical risks.
/
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C onfidentiality and D ata P rotection
The researcher will take every possible safety measure to uphold the confidentiality and anonymity o f  
the research participants’ data and identities. Any data collected from the participants as a result o f  the 
research will be used solely for the purpose o f the research and with their permission. Should any 
participant disagree to the use o f any piece o f  the information provided by him/her for research 
purpose, such data will not be used. For the questionnaire, respondent names will not be obtained 
during any phase o f the research process. Each questionnaire will have an Identification number for 
each respondent and the data obtained will be destroyed when the study is completed.
The interviews will be tape recorded and transcribed by the researcher later on. The researcher will also 
take all possible actions to protect the data collected from any unauthorised access, accidental 
disclosure, loss or destruction. The researcher shall keep the data under password protected storage. 
The audio data will be stored on the more secure Open University’s”*servers where it will be accessible 
to the researcher only. The data shall not be kept with the researcher longer than required, and will be 
destroyed once this research project is completed and the dissertation has been submitted to the 
research school.
For the benefit o f  participants, no personal information will be required in writing or any other stage o f  
this research and thus, the names o f the participants and their institutions shall be kept confidential and 
will be coded and pseudonyms such as Executive 1 or Non-Executive 1 etc. shall be used to denote the 
individuals who participate in the interviews. Other pseudonyms such as financial service or Oil and 
Gas sector shall also be used to denote the institutions. For purposes o f this research, the researcher 
shall dutifully adhere to the provisions contained in the Data Protection and Freedom o f Information 
Act, The Open University Code o f Practice for Research and Those Conducting Research, the Ethics 
Principles for Research involving Human Participants, and the Economic and Social Research 
Council’s Framework for Research Ethics. Therefore, data protection and confidentiality shall be 
maintained in strict accordance with the guidelines detailed herewith. The results o f the data shall be 
disseminated in the form of dissertation report and, possibly as an article for presentation at an 
academic conference or for publication in an academic journal.
Costs and Compensation
This research project is fully-funded by The Open University (UK), and will be pursued for the purpose 
of completing the Master o f Research dissertation module. The research participant therefore, shall not 
be obliged to bear any extra costs during the research process. The researcher shall approach the 
participant at his/her through email and at place o f work.
Voluntary Nature of Participation
Participation in the research process is voluntary and a participant has every right to refuse 
participation. In case o f agreement to participation, the respondent has the right to withdraw his/her 
participation before all the research data are analysed and final results are concluded.
Contact Details
In case o f any queries regarding this research project, please feel free to contact me or any o f my 
supervisors at The Open University.
Geofry Areneke (Researcher) Tel: UK +44 (0)1908 858983, Cameroon +237 
75591491 E-mails: Geofrv.Areneke@open.ac.uk
Dr. Devendra Kodwani (Lead Supervisor) Tel: UK +44 (0) 1908 655859 
E-mail: dk2567@openmail.open.ac.uk
Dr. Howard Viney (Supervisor) Tel: UK +44 (0) 1908 654599 E-mail:
hv74@ openm ail.open.ac.uk
Participation Agreement
I___________________________________________have had the opportunity to read this information and
consent form, ask questions where necessary and agreed to participate in this research project. I have 
been informed about the purpose, duration, risks, and benefits o f the project. I have also been assured 
about the confidentiality o f the information, and that research data will be confidential to the extent 
allowed by law, and thus shall remain secure and only used for academic purposes including writing 
research article in an academic journal. I have also been informed that I have the right to withdraw 
from participation before all the research data are analysed and final results are concluded.
I understand that if  I have any questions or concerns about this project, I can contact the researcher 
and/or his academic supervisors as listed above.
Participant’s Signature Date
Researcher’s Signature Date
Appendix IX - Questionnaire
R E S E A R C H  ON THE R O LE O F BO A RD  O F D IR E C T O R S IN C A M ER O O N
This questionnaire is aimed at understanding the role of board of directors in 
companies in Cameroon. The Open University UK politely asks you to fill this 
questionnaire. The research wishes to use your opinion on how your board 
functions to help understand what board of directors in Cameroon do.
All responses are strictly confidential and participant’s  confidentiality and 
anonymity will be protected.
For further information, please contact the researcher. Name: GEOFRY ARENEKE 
Email: geofry.areneke@open.ac.uk ITel: (237) 75 59 14 9110044 7805 234 253
Demography and Experience
Q1 W hat is your gender? Male O  Fem aleO
Q2 which age  tC&ckets do you Cfelong to? O  O  O
20-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 Above 60
O
Q3 what is your highest level of e d u c tio n ?
Below undergraduate degree U ndergraduate D egreeO  M asters DegreeO
Doctorate degree/PhD/DBA ProfessionalA/ocational qualificationO
Other.O P le a s e  s ta te _____________________________________________________________
Q4 How long have you worked for this com pany?
0-5 years 6 -1 5 y earsO  16-20 y earsO  Above 20 years O
Q5 How long have you been a director in this com pany?
0-5yearsQ 6-15yearsQ 16-20 y earsO  Above 20 yearsO
Q6 Are you a director on the board of other com panies? If yes p lease sta te  the total num ber 
of com panies w here you are board director in the text box. If 'No' p lease go to the next 
question.
Yes. O  __________________________________________________  No.O
In the subsequent statements, 'Board' refers to the Board of Directors, which includes 
both Executive and Non- Executive directors. 'Top Management or Management 
' refers to the Executive Directors of the company .i.e. those involved in the day to day 
running of the company including the CEO, MD, General Manager (GM), CFO, Branch 
Managers etc. Please provide your rating on how well your company's Board 
functions in relation to the following statements by selecting the rating -  Strongly 
Agree (SA), Agree (A), Neither Agree Nor Disagree (N) Disagree (D) and Strongly 
Disagree (SD)- that best reflects your view of how well your current Board functions.
Board Behavioural Control.
Q7 The board is actively involved in monitoring m anagem ent behaviours.
Strongly D isagreeO  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly A g r e e O
Q8The board is actively involved in defining the activities of the CEO, divisional and functional
O Om anagers. ^
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
O O
O O
Q9 The board is actively involved in supervising the CEO/MD/GM.
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly A g r e e O
O O
Q10 The Board is accountable to the com pany's shareholders.
Strongly Disagree D isagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly AgreeO
O O
B oards O utpu t C ontrQ  ^
O O
Q 11 The board ensu res that the activities of m anagem ent are in line with organizational
goals.
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
o
o
o
o
Q12 The board evaluates and approve m anagem ent plans and budgets .
Strongly D isagree O  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree ^  Strongly Agree ^
Q13 The board is kept^riformed of the financial igsition of the company.
Strongly D is a g re e ^  D isagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly A g r e e O
Q14 The board is sufficiently briefed by top m arQgem ent.
Strongly D isagree q  D isagree ^  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree q  Strongly Agree q
B oard S tra teg ic  C o n t^ p  Q
Q15 The board aq^Pely monitors and q ^ lu a te s  the strategic decisions taken 
by m anagem ent.
Strongly Disagree o  D isagree o  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly Agree O
Board S erv ice  Function
Q16 The board contributes and advises on m anagem ent issues.
Strongly Disagree O Disagree O Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
Q17 The board advises top m anagem ent on financial issues.
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree ^  Strongly Agree
Q18 The board advise g a n a g e m e n t on technical9ssues (e.g new technology in the industry) 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
O O
Q19 The board contributes and collaborates with m anagem ent on m arket issues (e.g. m arket
share, m arket opportunities).
Strongly D isagreeO Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly Agree O
Q20 The board contributes and advises m anagem ent on legal issues and taxation.
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Strongly D isagree O  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly Agree O
B oard N etworking Function
Q21 The board p r o v e s  linkages to im port^it external stakeholders (banks, financial
institutions, customersQoublic authorities and soOn)
Strongly D isagree Disagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
O O
Q22 The board provides the firm with external legitimacy (perceived by those  outside of the 
organizations) and contributes towards sustaining its reputation.
Strongly D isagreeq  D isagree q  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree o  Strongly Agree o
Q23 The Board gathers outside information for the com pany e.g. competition, new
technology, environmental concerns, governm en^legislature etc.
Strongly D isagreeq  D isagree q  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
O O
Board S tra teg ic  P artic ipation . q
Q24 The Board is actively involved in promoting strategic initiatives both inside and outside
the company. q  q
Strongly D isagreeO  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
Q25 The board is actively involved in the long-term strategic decision-making of the company. 
Strongly D isagree Disagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
Q26 The board is actively involved in implementing long-term strategic decisions.
Strongly D isagree D isagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
S tak eh o ld e r In terest
Q27 The board considers the interest of other stakeholders (e.g. Custom ers, Employees, and
Environm entalist ) in its strategic decision making.
Strongly Disagree O  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly Agree O
Q28 The board provides the com pany with legitimacy (recognition and legality) in its dealing 
with key stakeholders (Custom ers, Suppliers, Employees, Environmentalist, Government 
. . . . ) .
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly A g re e ^
O O
Q29 The board prioritize am ong stakeholder groups and allocate rights and responsibilities
among them accordingly.
Strongly Disagree O  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly Agree O
Q30 The board e n s u r ^ th e  satisfaction of all th ^ o m p a n y 's  stakeholders
Strongly D isa g re e ^  D isagree ^  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
Q31 The Board provides leadership by actively involving stakeholders in the decision making 
process of the company.
Strongly D isagree O  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly Agree O
In the subsequent statements, 'Directors' refers to both Executive and Non-Executive 
Directors.
O O
Board C om m itm ent ^  ^
Q32 Directors exam ine information provided by m anagem ent before board m eetings.
Strongly Disagree q  D isagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree q  Strongly Agree q
Q33 Directors actively ^ l le c t  further in form ation^ supplem ent that supplied by m anagers. 
Strongly Disagree q  Disagree q  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
O O '
Q34 Directors devote O e  necessary  time to accOnplish their tasks.
Strongly D isagree D isagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly A greeO
O O
Q35 Directors make them selves available to fulfill board activities.
Strongly D isagreeO Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree ^  Strongly A g re e ^
Q36 Directors more often than not attend board meetings.
Strongly Disagree D isagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
Q37 Directors use  their knowledge effectively a s  needed.
Strongly Disagree D isagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
Q38 Directors ask  useful questions about proposals advanced by m anagem ent.
Strongly D isagree O  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly Agree O
Q39 Directors raise criticQ points during m eetings.O  
Strongly D isagree ®  Disagree
Agree Strongly Agree
^  ^  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Q40 Directors com e to board m eetings well prepared.
Strongly Disagree O  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly Agree O
Q41 A gendas of board^meetings are well structured and organized.
Strongly Disagree n  D isagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
OAgree Strongly Agree
O O
B oard Critical D ebate
Q42 There is often conflicts and d isagreem ents on the decisions to be taken during 
board m eetings.
Strongly D isagree O  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree O  Strongly Agree O
Q43 D ebates and d isagreem ents on the interest of stakeholders occur frequency in board 
meetings.
Strongly D isagreeO  Disagree O  Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
O O
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O O
O O
Agree Strongly Agree
Q44 There is often conflict and disagreem ents on the general purpose of the company. 
Strongly D isagree Disagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
Q45 There are often conflicts and disagreem ents on how the board operates.
Strongly Disagree D isagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
Q46 There are conflict and d isagreem ents during the board decision making process. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
Q47 There are conflicts and disagreem ents am ong directors.
Strongly Disagree D isagree Neither Agree nor D isagreeO
Agree Strongly Agree
R eflection
Q48 In your opinion, what role does the board perform 
organizat____________________________________________________________________
in your
Q49 Has the questionnaire add ressed  all issues in respect to the role and perform ance of 
boards in your organization? Y e s ^  No. ^  P lease provide further information in 
regards to your responds. ______________________________________________________________
Q50 Will you like to participate in a follow up interview with the researcher? Y esO  No O  
FinaQ. will you like to be informed of the findings of the research?
Yes. P lease  provide an email for a  summary of the research  to be sen t to.
No O
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
Appendix X- Interview Schedule
I. What do you understand by corporate governance? From your point of view, 
what do you understand is corporate governance?
II. How do you perceive the process of corporate governance in Cameroon?
III. Does your board function following any corporate governance guidelines? 
For example the OH AD A.
IV. What is the most essential role(s) performed by your board?
V. Does the way your board functions affect the performance of your
organization? Performance in terms of profitability and or other performance 
criteria
VI. Does your board size affect the performance of your company? Board size in 
terms of the number of board members.
VII. Do your board members come to meeting prepared? Preparation relating to 
what to be discussed during board meetings.
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Appendix XI: Table 11- Interview ee Details
Interviewee Organisation Gender Age Current Position Professional Qualifications Experience 
as Director
Interlocks
CGPB1 A large national 
banking institution
Male 55 CEO Bachelor’s Degree 
Background :Experience as CEO 
and consultant in banking
3 Years 0
CGPAIN1 A large national 
agroindustry 
organisation with the 
government as the 
major shareholder.
Male 48 CEO Master’s Degree
Background : Civil engineering 
and agroindustry
5 Years 3
CGPB2 A medium size 
national Banking 
institution.
Male 56 Executive 
Director Audit 
and Internal 
Control
Bachelor’s Degree/IFA 
Background : banking, credit, 
compliance and audit
4 Years 0
CGPAIN3 A large national 
agroindustry 
organisation with 
government, local and 
foreign ownership.
Male 54 CEO Master’s Degree 
Background: agroindustry
10 Years 0
CGPT A large local privately 
owned transportation 
company.
Male 56 CEO Master’s Degree Background : 
Transport, banking and insurance 
Board chairman in a banking and 
an insurance company
12 years 2
CGAIN2 A medium local 
agroindustry 
organisation with 
government 
ownership.
Female 52 Finance
Director
Bachelor’s Degree 
Background: banking
16 Years 1
CGPB3 Large multinational 
bank.
Male 46 Executive 
Director and 
Head o f Finance 
and
Administration
Bachelor’s Degree/CPA 
Background : banking , Credit, 
Risk, Operations
8 Years 0
CGPOG Large multinational oil 
and gas company with 
both local private and 
foreign ownership.
Male 42 Executive
Director
Master’s Degree
Background : Investment banking 
and oil and gas
4 Year 1
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